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AFfER EUERTH: THE TANGIBLE EMPLOYMENT ACTION
IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT ANALYSIS

Susan Grover*

In this Article, Professor Grover argues that courts too readily allow employers to
avoid vicarious liability for supervisors' unlawful sexual harassment of subordinates. The Article explores the breadth of the affirmative defense first introduced in
the Supreme Court's 1998 cases oJFaragher v. Boca Raton and Burlington
Indus., Inc. v. EHerth. That defense clears an employer of liability for a supervisor's unlawful sexual harassment if (a) the employer exercised reasonable care to
prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) the plaintiff employee unreasonably Jailed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective
opportunities provided 1Yy the employer or to avoid harm otherwise. Because the defense applies only if the harasser takes no tangible employment action against the
harassed employee, the meaning ascribed to the "tangible employment action" concept is pivotal.
This Article concludes that courts often define the term too narrowly, or simply engage in outcome-based analysis, allowing defendants to invoke the affirmative
defense in cases that actually involve tangible employment actions, and thus
should not qualify for the defense. After reviewing the history sexual harassment
doctrine and of the rules for imputing liability to employers, Professor Grover explains the ways in which the Supreme Court's Ellerth and Faragher decisions
resolved some questions about imputing liability for harassment, but created others. She explores the range of meanings courts ascribe to the tangible employment
action concept, and suggests that such a broad application of the affirmative defense defeats the purpose of Title VII.

INTRODUCTION

With one exception/ federal employment discrimination law
holds employers liable for their supervisors
acts of
discrimination, regardless of the employer's negligence or knowl2
edge of the discrimination. This general "rule of uniform
Director of Equal Opportunity, College of William and Mary and Associate Profes*
so r of Law at William and Mary School of Law. A.B. , Hollins College; J.D., Georgetown. The
author has written articles on topics related to women's rights, employment discrimination
and civil procedure have appeared in numerous publications.
1.
The exception, applicable in certain harassment cases, is the subject of this Article.
2.
Employers are thus "strictly" liable for unlawful supervisory discrimination, including all types of harassment. Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 790, 807 (1998). "Strict
liability" (also known as "absolute liability") means "[l]iability that does not depend on
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imputation"?> derives directly from the statutory language, which
renders employers liable for the discriminatory acts of their
"agents."4 In most discrimination cases, supervisors are quintessentially agents of the employer; a supervisor who discriminates in the
course of taking an employment action that is his or her job to
take, is necessarily operating as the agent of the employer. 5 For this
actual negligence or intent to harm, but that is based on the breach of an absolute duty to
make something safe . .. [a]lso termed absolute liability; liability without fault." BLAcK's LAW
DICTIONARY 926 (7th ed. 1999). The concept of "strict" liability (liability regardless offault)
is thus distinct from the concept of defeasible liability, which may be strict (imposed in the
absence of fault), but which may be evaded under proper conditions. The plaintiff in a strict
liability case bears no burden to prove the defendant's knowledge or fault, but if the liability
is defeasible, the defendant may escape the liability by proving its own reasonableness or
due care. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
3.
This Article uses interchangeably the terms "impute liability to" and "hold vicariously liable." Black's Law Dictionary defines "imputed" to mean "attributed vicariously; that
is an act, fact, or quality is said to be 'imputed' to a person when it is ascribed or charged to
him, not because he is personally cognizant of it or responsible for it, but because another
person is, over whom he has control or for whose acts or knowledge he responsible."
BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 758 (6th ed. 1990). The Article refers to the courts' standard
practice of holding employers vicariously liable for supervisors' acts of discrimination as the
"rule of uniform imputation."
4.
This Article focuses on Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act because that is the federal law forbidding workplace discrimination based on sex, including sexual harassment at
work. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (defining "unlawful employment practices" as discrimination
based on "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin"). Section 703 of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 provides:
The term "employer" means a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce
who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more
calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a
person ...
42 U.S.C. § 2000e (b).
Other federal laws, such as those prohibiting age and disability discrimination, similarly
impose liability on employers for the discriminatory acts of their supervisors. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621, 629 (defining "employer" to
include any agent of an employer); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §
12101 , 12111 (defining "employer" to include agents of employers) . The law does not generally impose liability on the supervisors themselves. See, e.g., Lenhardt v. Basic lnst. of Tech.,
Inc., 55 F.3d 377, 380-81 (8th Cir. 1995) (describing the recent trend away from holding
individual managers liable under Title VII) ; Sauers v. Salt Lake City, 1 F.3d 1122, 1125 (lOth
Cir. 1993) (Title VII relief is against employer, not against individual employees whose acts
create liability) quoting Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 772 (11th Cir. 1991 ); see also
SoLOTOFF & KRAMER, SEX DISCRIMINATION AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORK PLACE
§ 2.02[1] (2000) (noting recent decisions that have rejected individual supervisor liability
under Title VII).
5.
The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(1) provides what the Supreme
Court has described as "a central principle of agency law: 'A master is subject to liability for
the torts of his servants committed while acting in the scope of their employment.'" See
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 755-56 (1998) (quoting REsTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY§ 219(1)) . Compare this with the rule for assessing employer responsibility for punitive damages. In the latter inquiry, employers who lack knowledge of their
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reason, most discrimination cases have yielded little discussion of
the rule of uniform imputation. The single exception to the rule,
by contrast, has received substantial attention since its introduction
in 1998. That exception arises in certain cases involving sexual or
other discriminatory workplace harassment.6 As with "mainstream"
(non-harassment) discrimination cases, the law imputes liability to
employers for all actionable supervisor harassment, without regard
to employer knowledge or negligence. Unlike employers charged
with mainstream discrimination, however, employers charged with
harassment enjoy the possibility of an escape route in some cases.
The potential escape route is an affirmative defense, and it is available in those cases in which the harassment involves no tangible
7
employment action against the victim. Because the potential for
employers to escape application of the rule of uniform imputation
exists only in harassment cases that involve no tangible employment action, it matters a great deal what definition courts give to
the term: "tangible employment action." This Article explores the
evolving definition of that concept.
Part I of the Article sets forth the history of pertinent sexual
harassment doctrine and of the rules for imputing liability to employers. Part II explains the ways in which Supreme Court
decisions have resolved some questions about imputing liability for
harassment, but created others. It looks at the birth of the tangible
employment action concept as a bright line test for determining
which imputation analysis applies to a given harassment case. In
Part III, the Article explores the range of meanings courts ascribe
to the tangible employment action concept. The Article concludes
that courts often define the term too narrowly, allowing defendants
to invoke the affirmative defense in cases that actually involve tangible employment actions, and thus should not qualify for the
defense.

supervisors' culpable behavior may be able to avert the imposition of punitive damages.
Kolstad v. American Dental Association allows a good faith defense. 527 U.S. 526, 545 (1999).
6.
This Article focuses on sexual harassment, but harassment may be actionable when
motivated by some other protected trait, such as race or religion. See, e.g., Cerros v. Steel
Techs., Inc., 288 F.3d 1040, 1047 (7th Cir. 2002) (stating that severe or pervasive verbal racial
and religious harassment actionable under Title VII).
7.
Because individual supervisors are not personally liable under Title VII, victims of
unlawful sexual harassment who fail to recover from the employer, effectively have a legal
right with no remedy. Plaintiffs who lose Title VII's protections in this manner, however, may
recover under state law. In fact, some state laws provide broader remedies than those available under Title VII. See, e.g., Laughinghouse v. Risser, 786 F. Supp. 920 (D. Kan. 1992)
(stating that state law permits recovery against both supervisor and employer).
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BACKGROUND

8

Title VII prohibits sex discrimination in employment. Sex discrimination occurs when supervisors base employment decisions,
such as hiring and promotion, on considerations of an employee's
sex, rather than or in additional to such legitimate considerations
9
as the employee's qualifications and performance record. Sex discrimination also occurs when a supervisor engages in sexual
harassment that alters the terms, conditions, or privileges of a sub10
ordinate's employment. Actionable sexual harassment may take
any of a variety of forms. Workplace taunts and insults that are motivated by the victim's sex may give rise to sexual harassment
11
discrimination claims, as may sexual demands and suggestions.
Sometimes actionable harassment culminates in the harasser's taking adverse job action against the victim, and sometimes it does
12
not.
The latter category-claims involving environmental harassment that does not include adverse employment action against
the victim-first received Supreme Court recognition in the 1986
case of Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson. 13 At issue in that case was
whether Mechele Vinson could win her Title VII harassment case,
even though the harassing supervisor had not taken adverse
14
job action against her.
The Court concluded that she
8.
The other categories of discrimination forbidden by Title VII are race, religion,
color and national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
9.
42 U.S.C § 2000e-2(a) (2) . If there are several motives for an employment decision,
some discriminatory and some not, the employer is nevertheless found liable, though proof
of the nondiscriminatory reasons reduces the remedy, excluding money damages and certain types ofinjunctions. See42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).
10.
Workplace sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act, which prohibits discrimination in employment based on race, sex, color, religion, and
national origin, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17. See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U .S.
17 ( 1993) (explaining elements of hostile environmental sexual harassment claim); Meritor
Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (recognizing claims for hostile environment and
quid pro quo sexual harassment). Sexual harassment violates the proscription of sex discrimination only if the harassment is motivated by the victim's sex. Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
11.
Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79-80.
12.
Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 786 (1998) (scope of actionable harassment
not limited to economically measurable harm).
13.
477 U .S. 57 (1986) .
14.
/d. at 64. By the time of Meritor, it had already been well-established that cases in
which supervisors barter sexual favors for job advantages violate Title VII. See id. at 68 ("'It is
without question that sexual harassment of female employees in which they are asked or
required to submit to sexual demands as a condition to obtain empluyment or to maintain emplayment or to obtain promotions falls within protection of Title VII." ') (emphasis in original)
(quoting lower court, Vinson v. Taylor, No. 78-1793, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10676, at *23
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could. ,r. The Meritor Court distinguished between "quid pro quo"
harassment cases, in which a supervisor threatens to take jobrelated action against the victim, and environmental cases like
16
Vinson's, in which the environment alone gives rise to the claim.
The court suggested that both types of harassment could give rise
to claims, but that the rules for imputing liability to employers
17
might be different for the two. For purposes of imputing liability
to the employer, quid pro quo harassment had always been treated
like any other employment discrimination: subject to the rule of
uniform imputation. 18 With the recognition of environmental harassment, the Meritor Court called for rethinking of the rule's
uniformity. By definition, the new environmental claims lacked
precisely the ingredient that had assured the existence of the
agency relationship in quid pro quo cases: the supervisor's dis19
criminatory use of delegated power to take or threaten action
against the plaintiff that it was within the supervisor's job description to take. Because that guarantee of an agency relationship was
absent from environmental harassment, the Meritor Court envisioned situations in which supervisors would engage in such
harassment without the aid of delegated authority. For this reason,
(D.D.C. Feb 26, 1980)). Interestingly, the facts of Vinson's case probably involved economic
harm. The discriminatory harassment at issue arguably led to Vinson's consuuctive discharge. The MeritorCourt's decision did not address that issue.
15.
Courts accepted the quid pro quo theory of harassment more readily and earlier
than they accepted the hostile environment cause of action. See Glenn George, Empfqyer
Liability for Sexual Harassment: The Buck Stops l11u>re134 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1, 3-5 & nn.1323 (discussing courts' ready acceptance of quid pro quo sexual harassment cause of action
under Title VII and hesitance to recognize the hostile environment cause of action). The
courts' ultimate acceptance of sexually hostile environment claims was predicated on their
well-established acceptance of racially hostile environment claims. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at
786 (citing race and national-origin cases upon which the Meritor Court predicated recognition of environmental sexual harassment claim).
16.
477 U.S at 68.
17.
!d.
18.
See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 790 (relying on Meritor, 477 U.S at 70-71, for the proposition that discrimination with tangible results has always resulted in employer liability
regardless of employer knowledge or negligence); Burlington lndust., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524
U.S. 742, 753 (1998) (noting "equivalence of quid pro quo label and vicarious liability").
19.
Prior to 1998, courts disagreed on whether the rule of uniform imputation applied
to quid pro quo cases in which the supervisor did not carry out the threat. Some lower
courts recognized as quid pro quo only those cases in which the supervisor actually followed
through and took the threatened action against the harassment victim. See, e.g., Bryson v.
Chicago State Univ., 96 F.3d 912 (7th Cir. 1996), Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 908-09
(11th Cir. 1982) . Other courts applied the rule of uniform imputation even where the threat
was unactuated. See, e.g., Reinhold v. Virginia, 135 F.3d 920, 933 n.3 (4th Cir. 1998), vacated
for reconsideration in light of Ellerth and Faragher, 135 F.3d 920 (1998) (discussing pre-Ellerth
court decisions holding that threats suffice to state a quid pro quo claim, despite the absence of action taken on the threats); Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773, 778 (2d Cir.
1994).
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the Court directed lower courts to use the principles of agency law
to derive appropriate standards for environmental harassment
cases. 20 In the wake of Meritor21 the lower courts generally held employers liable for supervisors' harassment of subordinates in
accordance with the following schema:

PosT- MERITOR
TYPE OF CLAIM

Qum PRO Quo

HOSTILE

Facts Typically Giving Rise to
Claim:

Harasser threatens or takes
employment action against
(or in favor of) a subordinate
employee 22 in exchange for
sexual favors.

Standard for Holding
Employer Liable for Acts of
Supervisor:

Employer is liable for all acts
of supervisor, without regard
to employer knowledge,
negligence, response to
harassment or attempt to
guard against harassment.

Sexual harassment is severe
or pervasive enough to
create an abusive work
environment, thereby altering
the terms, conditions or
privileges of employment.
Courts (charged by Meritor
Court to) apply agency
principals to the facts of the
case in order to determine
whether such principals
warrant vicarious liability on
the particular facts of the
case.

ENVIRONMENT

In response to Meritor's command to devise an analysis appropriate to environmental cases, the lower courts produced such a
disarray of approaches that the Supreme Court accepted certiorari
in two appellate court decisions to resolve the circuit split on the

20.
477 U.S. at 63. Increasingly, it is clear that the only possible liability under Title VII
is that of the employer, and that individual supervisors who engage in discriminatory acts are
not liable in their individual capacity. See supra note 3. This means that limitations on the
scope of employer vicarious liability for discrimination effectively limit the scope of Title VII
itself.
21.
Between the 1986 decision in Meritor and the 1998 Ellerth and Faragher decisions,
the Court twice elaborated on the elements of the hostile environment cause of action itself.
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998); Harris v. Forklift Sys. Inc., 510
U.S. 17 (1993) . Most importantly, the Harris Court held that the plaintiff in a hostile environment case need not prove psychological injury to establish harassment. 510 U.S. at 22.
Courts have sometimes defined "quid pro quo" to include cases in which a supervi22.
sor tries to bargain with a subordinate to exchange employment benefit or detriment for
sexual favors or refusals, even though no tangible employment action ("TEA") against the
subordinate ensues. See Reinhold 35 F.3d at 933 n .3 (discussing pre-Ellerth court d ecisions
holding that threats suffice to state a quid pro quo claim, despite the absence of action
taken on the threats). On the other hand, TEA's, as defined by the Supreme Court, may
involve employment actions taken against the subordinate that are part and parcel of the
harassment, even though they are not in retaliation for the subordinate's failure to submit to
sexual overtures.

SuMMER 2002]

After Ellerth

815

imputation issue. The two cases were Faragher v. Boca Raton25 and
24
Burlington Industries v. Ellerth.

II.

BETH ANN FARAGHER AND KIMBERLY ELLERTH

Beth Ann Faragher and Kimberly Ellerth both claimed that their
former employers should be held liable for their supervisors' sexual harassment.25 Faragher's was inarguably a hostile environment
case, calling upon the Court to elucidate the employer liability
26
standard envisaged in Meritor. Ellerth, by contrast, characterized
27
her case as quid pro quo. Ellerth 's supervisor threatened to retaliate for Ellerth's refusal to submit to his sexual demands, but had
never carried out the threats. 28 Ellerth apparently hoped that the
threats themselves would qualify her case for the traditional quid
pro quo rule of uniform imputation, without resort to the agency
analysis that Meritor prescribed for environmental cases. Unfortunately for Ellerth, the Court realigned the boundaries between
types of harassment, positing that it was not the threats but the actuality of employment action that rendered a harassment case
subject to the traditional rule of uniform imputation. The Court
placed unfulfilled threats on the environmental side of the employer liability divide, ultimately opening the possibility that
Ellerth's employer might avoid liability for the harassment. 29
A. Kimberly Ellerth s Case

Kimberly Ellerth's harasser was Ted Slowik, her supervisor's supervisor.30 According to Ellerth, Slowik sexually harassed her by
making remarks about her physique and conditioning approval of
client-based requests on her willingness to wear more revealing
31
clothing. When Ellerth resisted Slowik's advances, Slowik warned
her, "[Y] ou know, Kim, I could make your life very hard or very
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

524 u.s. 775 (1998).
524 u.s. 742 (1998).
Faragher, 524 U.S. at 780; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 746.
Faragher, 524 U.S. at 791-92.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 749, 753, 765.
/d. at 747-48.
/d. at 754.
ld. at 747.
!d. at 748.
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32

easy at Burlington." Ellerth complained directly to Slowik, but did
not complain to anyone else during the fourteen months that
33
Slowik harassed her. Although Ellerth knew that the company had
an anti-harassment policy, she also knew that the policy required
her to report the harassment to her immediate supervisor, who was
required to report to the next higher supervisor, who was Ted
Slowik himsel(w Ultimately, Ellerth resigned her position, initially
asserting reasons for leaving the company that were unrelated to
35
the harassment. Three weeks later, however, she sent a letter to
explain that her real reason for leaving was in fact the harassment.36 That letter was the first time she complained to anyone at
37
the company other than Slowik.
Given the Meritor analytical paradigm, it was no wonder that
Ellerth couched her complaint in terms of quid pro quo harassment: threats had been made. The problem with Ellerth's lawsuit
was that Slowik never followed through on the threats when Ellerth
rejected his sexual advances. 38 The case was one of quid pro quo
only in the sense that Slowik consistently told Ellerth that she
would experience tangible job effects depending on how she responded to his requests. It was not a quid pro quo case, however,
inasmuch as Slowik never took the threatened or promised actions.39 Because Slowik did not take employment actions against
Ellerth, the Supreme Court characterized her case as environmental and used the occasion, along with the Faragher case, to
40
revisit more specifically the imputation issues raised by Meritor.

I d.
ld. at 748-49.
34.
ld. at 748.
I d.
35.
I d.
36.
37.
ld. at 748-49.
38.
The only exception to this was the occasion when he refused to help her on the
telephone with a customer matter because she refused to tell him what she was wearing at
the time. ld. at 748.
In fact, Ellerth ·was actually promoted during her time with the company, despite
39.
her refusal to submit to Slowik's demands. ld. at 748.
40.
The Supreme Court did n o t e xplain what would happen where the target averted
TEA by succumbing to sexual d e mands. The EEOC guidelines provided that such cases
sho uld be subjec t to the rule of uniform imputation. EEOC Enforcement Guidance: Vicarious Employer Liability for Unlawful Harassment by Supervisors (june 18, 1999) available at
http:/ / www.eeoc.gov.

32.
on

.:>.:>.
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B. Beth Ann Faragher's Case

Beth Ann Faragher's case was simpler. During her college years,
Beth Ann Faragher worked part time and during summers as a
41
lifeguard for the City of Boca Raton, Florida. Mter she resigned
her position, Faragher sued the City, claiming that two of her immediate supervisors, Bill Terry and David Silverman, had "created a
42
'sexually hostile atmosphere' at the beach." Faragher's complaint
involved ongoing '"uninvited and offensive touching,' ... lewd remarks; and . . . speaking of women in offensive terms. "43 She
alleged that Terry, Chief of the Marine Safety Division that employed Faragher, "repeatedly touched the bodies of female
employees without invitation, . . . put his arm around Faragher,
with his hand on her buttocks, and once made contact with another female lifeguard in a motion of sexual simulation. He made
crudely demeaning references to women generally, and once
commented disparagingly on Faragher's shape."44 He allegedly told
a female job applicant that "female lifeguards had sex with their
45
male counterparts and asked whether she would do the same."
Similarly, Silverman "once tackled Faragher and remarked that,
but for a physical characteristic he found unattractive, he would
readily have had sexual relations with her." 46 Silverman also "pantomimed an act of oral sex . . . [w] ithin earshot of the female
lifeguards, . . . made frequent, vulgar references to women and
sexual matters, commented on [women's bodies], and ... told female lifeguards that he would like to engage in sex with them."47
A bench trial yielded a victory for Faragher. 48 The trial court
concluded that Faragher's supervisors' sexual harassment of

41.
Faragher, 524 U.S. at 780.
42.
/d.
43.
/d. Faragher's complaint alleged "that Terry once said that he would never promote a woman to the rank of lieutenant, and that Silverman had said to Faragher, 'Date me
or clean the toilets for a year.'" /d. In addition to the Title VII claim, Faragher's complaint
included claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and state law. /d.
44.
/d. at 782 (citations omitted).
45.
/d.
46.
/d.
47.
/d. (citations omitted).
48.
/d. at 783. The judges at all levels were generally in agreement that the harassers
were Faragher's supervisors and that the facts of Faragher's case established the elements of
a hostile environment case, so the only question was whether liability should be imputed to
the employer.
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Faragher violated Title VII. 49 The trial court also concluded that
agency principles required imputation of the harassment to the
employer, as did the employer's "'knowledge, or constructive
50
51
knowledge."' The Eleventh Circuit reversed. Although it agreed
that the supervisors had engaged in unlawful harassment, it concluded that agency principles did not warrant imputation of the
harassment to the employer. 52 The Supreme Court, in turn, disagreed with the Eleventh Circuit and ordered reinstatement of the
judgment for plaintiff. 53

C. The Rule of Faragher and Ellerth

Faragher and Ellerth did two things: first, they realigned the
boundary between harassment cases subject to the rule of uniform
imputation and those in which employers might avoid liability; and
second, they devised a new analytic framework for determining
when, in the latter group, such avoidance would be possible. As to
the boundary realignment, the Court exempted cases such as
Ellerth's, in which threats were made but not carried out, from the
rule of uniform imputation. The crucial demarcation, the
Faragher/Ellerth Court said, is hot that suggested by Meritor between
quid pro quo cases (involving sexual demands) and environmental
cases; rather, it is between cases in which the harasser actually takes
54
a tangible employment action (hereinafter "TEA" ) against the
victim, regardless of whether sexual demands are made, and cases
in which the supervisor takes no TEA, even though threats may
have been made. 55 If the harassment involves a TEA, the Court ex49.
/d. Specifically, the trial court concluded that the supervisors engaged in "discriminatory harassment sufficiently serious to alter the conditions of Faragher's employment
and constitute an a busive working environment." /d. at 783.
50.
/d. (quoting trial court, 864 F. Supp. 1552, 1563 (S.D. Fla. 1!:194)).
51.
/d. at 78~4.
52.
/d. at 784. The appellate panel acknowledged that "the existence of the agency relationship" always aids a supervisor to accomplish hostile environment sexual harassment
"because his responsibilities include dose proximity to and regular contact with the victim,"
but concluded that traditional agency law does not employ so broad a concept of aid as a
predicate to employer liability, requiring something more that a mere combination of
agency relationship and improper conduct by the agent. /d. at 785.
53.
/d. at 808.
54.
Courts tha t continue to use the "quid pro quo" language in the post-Ellerth era may
create confusion because it is not clear whether the term refers to all cases involving threats
or bargains (as some courts read the language to mean in Meritor) or only tangible employment action cases.
55.
The Court purported to base the new analysis on the prong of agency law that
renders principals liable when the existence of the agency relationship aids their servants in
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plained, the case qualifies for the traditional rule of uniform imputation.56 Thus, it was not the presence of sexual demands that
qualified a case for the uniform imputation rule, but the presence
of concrete job action against the victim.
The Faragher/Ellerth Court went on to sketch a new analytic
method to guide lower court determinations of whether to impute
liability to employers in non-TEA (hereinafter "environmental" or
57
"hostile environment") cases. This analysis renders the employer
presumptively liable both for supervisors' TEA action harassment
and for supervisors' hostile environment harassment. However,
whereas the employer has no opportunity to rebut the presumption in TEA cases, the employer in environmental cases has an
opportunity to avoid vicarious liability if it can prove both elements
of an affirmative defense. 58 In the words of the Faragher Court:
the commission of wrongful acts. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 789. But see Michael Harper, Empluyer
Liability for Harassment Under Title VII: A Functional Rationale for Faragher and Ellerth, 36 SAN
DIEGO L. REv. 41, 55-56 (1999) (arguing that the "Faragher·Ellerth formulation was not compelled by common law agency principles"). Ellerth/Faragher effectively established a
presumption that supervisors who harass, whether environmentally or by taking more formal action against the subordinate, are necessarily aided by the agency relationship. The
Court's injection of the affirmative defense reflected the Court's belief that the agency relationship necessarily aids the harassment in TEA cases, but not of necessity in environmental
cases. The suggestion that the Court relied on agency law is belied by the Court's election of
the demarcation between TEA and other cases, because quid pro quo cases not resulting in
a TEA are certainly empowered by the agency relationship as well.
56.
Faragher, 524 U.S. at 789. The Faragher Court acknowledged the unanimity with
which courts had accepted the rule that employers cannot avoid vicarious liability for sexual
or racial harassment that involves supervisors' employment actions with tangible results,
such as hiring, firing, promotion, compensation, and work assignment. /d. Even in the absence of a TEA, the Court noted, the employer cannot avoid vicarious liability if the
employer or high-echelon officials actually know of the harassment.
57.
Despite the Meritor mandate to predicate such analysis on agency law, the
Faragher/Ellerth Court ultimately created a structure that turned more on negligence principles than on agency law. Agency law focuses generally on the relationship between the
principal and its agent, whereas the Faragher/Ellerth framework focuses ultimately on considerations of reasonableness. In fact the Court perceived its prescribed analytic framework as a
compromise between the principle of vicarious liability for harm caused by misuse of supervisory authority and "Title VII's . . . policies of encouraging forethought by employers and
saving action by objecting employees." Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
58.
By making these issues part of an affirmative defense, rather than elements of
plaintiffs claim, the Court placed the burden of persuasion on the defendant. This procedural shift of the burden of is crucial because, in theory, the plaintiff has now won the case
unless the employer proves the defense by a preponderance of the evidence. But see Cheryl L.
Anderson, Thinking Within the Box: How Proof Models Are Used To Limit The Scope OJ Sexual
Harassment Law 19 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. LJ. 125, 134 (2001) (suggesting employer is liable
only if it fails on both prongs of the affirmative defense, where both defendant is negligent
and the plaintiff is ·not negligent). In fact, either the defendant's negligence or the plaintiffs reasonable care destroys the affirmative defense. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807 (using
conjunctive, rather than disjunctive, in describing the elements of the affirmative defense:
"defense comprises two necessary elements: (a) that the employer exercised reasonable care
to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff
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[A]n employer is subject to vicarious liability to a victimized
employee for an actionable hostile environment created by a
supervisor with immediate (or successively higher) authority
over the employee. When no [TEA] is taken, a defending
employer may raise an affirmative defense to liability or damages, subject to proof by a preponderance of the evidence.
The defense comprises two necessary elements: (a) that the
employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct
promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the
plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of
any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the
employer or to avoid harm otherwise. 59

employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise" (emphasis added)).
In the wake of Ellerlh and Faragher, a few courts suggested that those decisions had broadened the definition of "supervisor" from what it had been in prior case law. See Stephanie
Ann Henning Blackman, The Faragher and Ellerth Problem: Luwer Courts' Confusion &garding
the Definition of "Supervisor," 54 VAND. L. REv. 123, 152 n.230 (citing cases). Cases prior to
Ellerth and Faragher defined "supervisor" to mean someone with the power to hire, fire or
otherwise set the conditions of employment. /d. at 125. In Ellerth and Faragher, the Supreme
Court defined "supervisor" as someone with "immediate (or successively higher) authority
over the employee." Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807. There is no necessary
difference between these two definitions, inasmuch as "authority" over the subordinate
connotes power to affect terms of employment. Given that the power to assign work is and
always has been an indicium of supervisory status, the pre- and post-Ellerth/Faragher definitions are consistent. The power to hire or fire is a sign of supervisory status, but so is the
power to assign work, which is clearly a condition of employment. See Paroline v. Unisys
Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 104 (4th Cir. 1989).
59.
524 U.S. at 807 (citations omitted). On this prong of the affirmative defense, the
Court noted that plaintiff's unreasonable failure to make use of an employer-provided complaint procedure would usually be a sufficient showing but not the only way for defendants
to meet this element of the defense. /d. at 807-08. As things have evolved after Ellerth and
Faragher, however, many courts have granted summary judgments to defendants based solely
on the defendant's meeting the first element of the defense, even though the plaintiff's
timely use of defendant's procedures made it impossible for the defendant to meet the second element. See, e.g., Reese v. Meritor Auto., Inc., No. 00-1604, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 3517
(4th Cir. Mar. 8, 2001); David Sherwyn et al., Don't Train Your Employees and Cancel Your "1800" Harassment Hotline: An Empirical Examination and Correction of the FUzws in the Affirmative
Defense to Sexual Harassment Charges, 69 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1265 (2001). But see johnson v.
West, 218 F.3d 725, 731 (7th Cir. 2000) (requiring that defendant meet both prongs of the
defense). Interestingly, the Ellerth/Faragher Court seemed ambivalent about whether the
affirmative defense would forestall liability entirely, or whether it would have the lesser impact that affirmative defenses have sometimes recently had in the employment
discrimination context: cutting off monetary damages, but still allowing the plaintiff to recover attorney's fees. The EEOC guidelines reflect this uncertainty. They provide: "When
harassment by a supervisor creates an unlawful hostile environment but does not result in a
[TEA], the employer can raise an affirmative defense to liability or damages, which it must
prove by a preponderance of the evidence." EEOC Enforcement Guidance: Vicarious Employer Liability for Unlawful Harassment by Supervisors (June 18, 1999), available at
http:/ /www.eeoc.gov.
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Thus, absent the supervisor's taking a TEA against the victim, the
employer may avert vicarious liability if it proves, by a preponderance of the evidence, its own reasonable care and the victim's lack
60
thereof.
In Faragher's case, the Supreme Court concluded that the City
of Boca Raton could not prevail on the affirmative defense. 61 The
City's sexual harassment policy and procedures had already been
2
found as a factual matter to be utterly ineffective. 5 In fact, the trial
court had found a complete failure on the part of the City to dis63
seminate its policy among lifeguards employed by the City. The
Court remanded Ellerth's case, by contrast, to allow Burlington
Industries an opportunity to assert and prove the newly available
64
affirmative defense.
65
The categories of harassment after Ellerth and Faragher, and the
concomitant standards for imputing liability to the employer are:

60.
Faragher, 524 U.S. at 80&-07. The Court cautioned that employers would not always
need to prove the existence of harassment policies and complaint procedures, and that the
existence of such a policy would not invariably excuse the employer. /d. at 807.
61 .
/d. at 808-09.

62.
/d.
63.
!d. at 808 (quoting trial court, Fraghaer v. City of Boca Raton, 864 F. Supp. 1552,
1560 (S.D. Fla. 1994)).
64.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 766.
65.
I include quid pro quo claims absent TEA with environmental claims under the assumption that the supervisor's proposal to base employment decisions on the victim's
complicity in sexual demands necessarily constitutes an instance severe enough to be actionable as hostile environment harassment. See Steven H . Aden, "Harm in Asking": A Reply to
Eugene Scalia and an Analysis of the Paradigm Shift in the Supreme Courts Title VII Sexual Harassment jurisprudence, 8 TEMP. PoL. & Crv. RTs. L. REv. 477, 498-499 (1999) (describing harm

that accrues from threatS to condition employment decisions on victim 's engaging in sex
even without actuation of threatened event). But see jones v. Clinton, 990 F. Supp. 657, 676
(E.D. Ark. 1998) (finding no hostile work environment) .
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PosT- EILERTH
TYPE OF CLAIM

TEA

HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT

Facts Typically Giving Rise
to Claim

Superviso,.OO hires, fires,
otherwise takes direct
(often economic) action
against the victim in
connection with
harassment, including
fulfilling quid pro quo
threats.67

Supervisor engages in
harassment so severe or
pervasive68 that it creates an
abusive working environment and
alters the terms, conditions or
privileges of the victim's
employment69 -including
unfulfilled threats.

Standard for Holding
Employer Liable for Acts of
Supervisor

Employer is liable without a
showing of negligence for
supervisor harassment; no
affirmative defense
available (i.e., rule of
uniform imputation).

Employer is liable without a
showing of negligence for
supervisor harassment, but
affirmative defense is available.

Courts' analysis of vicarious liability for supervisor harassment now
should proceed in accordance with the following flow chart:

66.
Only supervisors are capable of TEA's. It has sometimes been argued that supervisors should be defined as those who are empowered to take TEA against their subordinates,
and that the term should not encompass those whose supervisory powers are of a Jesser
scale. See Blackman, supra note 58.
67.
It is not clear what the standard is for the supervisor's rewarding an employee who
submits to the sexual demands. It is also not clear what the standard for employer liability is
for the constructive discharge of the employee. Ellerth, who allegedly resigned her position
because of the harassment, would probably have been a candidate for a constructive discharge claim if she had alleged that the harassment made conditions so intolerable that she
had no choice but to leave. She did not allege precisely that, however; so when the Ellerth
Court states that "EIIerth has not alleged she suffered a tangible employment action at the
hands of Slowik," the Court is not precluding the possibility that she might have done so. See
524 U.S. at 766.
68.
Arguably, the harasser's status as a supervisor means that a threat of retaliation for
failure to submit to a sexual advance is by definition severe.
69.
Faragher, 524 U.S. at 786 (quoting Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67). Even though unfulfilled
threats of retaliation for refusal to submit to advances can no longer invoke the rule of uniform imputation, the presence of such threats should be sufficient to establish that the
environmental harassment is severe. The supervisor's deliberate use of delegated authority
to attempt to extract sex from a subordinate employee goes to the heart of the sort of discriminatory use of authority that Title VII prohibits.
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70

EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR SUPERVISOR'S HARASSMENT
WHEN

Is

THE EMPLOYER VICARIOUSLY LIABLE FOR SUPERVISORS'

7

'

HARASSMENT OF SUBORDINATE EMPLOYEES?
Did Harassing Supervisor
take a
tangible employment action
against the target?
1
If no,
has plaintiff pleaded/proved
that supervisor created an
actionable hostile environment?

I

If yes,
employer liable
no defense

I

If yes,
employer liable but may invoke
affirmative defense, and will prevail if
proves both prongs of defense

I

If no,
employer is
not liable for supervisor
harassment under Title VII

I
Has defendant
pleaded/proved that
(1) defendant responded adequately, and
(2) that the plaintiff failed to avoid hann?

If yes,
employer
averts
liability

If no,
employer is
liable for
supervisor harassment

In the wake of Ellerth/Faragher, characterizing a sexual harass72
ment case as TEA is usually dispositive. Theoretically, of course, a

70. Judge Tom Stagg, Senior District judge of the Western District of Louisiana, posited a similar flow-chart or "roadmap," which was included as an appendix to the Fifth
Circuit opinion in Casiano v. AT&T Corp., 213 F.3d 278, 288 (5th Cir. 2000). The Casiano
schema has the disadvantage of suggesting that the only harassment TEA's that fall under
the rule of uniform imputation are those in which the supervisor takes the action against the
employee because of how the employee responded to the harassment. See id. at 285; compare
id. with Vicki Schultz, &conceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE LJ. 1683, 1689 (1998)
(arguing that courts erroneously exclude from coverage nonsexualized sexual harassment).
In fact, the Casiano chart even expressly limits the TEA category to quid pro quo cases without mention of those TEA cases that are not quid pro quo but simply environmental
harassment culminating in the TEA. 213 F.3d at 288.
71.
Courts disagree on the issue of who is a supervisor for these purposes. See Blackman, supra note 58, at 125 (discussing disagreement).
72.
See, e.g., Casiano, 213 F.3d 278. The ramifications of the Ellerth/Faragher decisions
extend beyond harassment doctrine. Courts and commentators have suggested that the
affirmative defenses should be made available in retaliation and other non-harassment. See,
e.g., Linda M. Glover, Title VII section 704(a) Retaliation Claims: Turning a Blind Eye Toward

824

University ofMichigan Journal ofLaw Refarm

[VoL. 35:4

finding that harassment encompassed no TEA against the plaintiff
simply permits the employer to invoke the defense, but indicates
nothing about whether the employer will meet its burden of persuasion on both elements. In practice, however, decisional law
since Ellerth and Faragher demonstrates that defendants permitted
to invoke the defense generally win their cases. Two studies of harassment cases decided after the Ellerth/Faragher decisions reveal an
overwhelming tendency for employers to win on the affirmative
73
defense. The studies looked at opinions on summary judgment
motions in which employers "argued that a hostile-environment
case should be dismissed because the employer satisfied, as a mat74
ter of law, the affirmative defense." The studies' results suggest
that courts operate under an unspoken presumption in favor of
defendants on the affirmative defense, rather than against them as
the burden of persuasion requires. The researchers concluded that
many of the judicial opinions on the affirmative defense were result oriented. "[T]o reward an employer who responds adequately
to a harassment complaint, courts often find that the complaining
employee acted 'unreasonably' as a matter of law, even when such
a determination may merit a more thorough review of the facts of
75
the case." Plaintiffs who lose on the TEA issue, thus, generally lose
their cases.

Ill.

PROBLEMS IN DEFINITION

Despite arguments favoring a broad definition for the TEA concept, courts often err on the side of finding environmental
76
harassment. Because this mischaracterization allows defendants to
Justice, 38 Hous. L. REv. 577, 581 n.21 (2001) (arguing that Ellerth affirmative defense
should be available in retaliatory harassment cases brought under section 704 of Title VII).
73.
See Shernyn, supra note 59, at 1288 (study results indicate that employers prevail
regardless of whether plaintiffs exercised reasonable care; employers won in a majority of
cases in which defendants invoked affirmative defense on summary judgment); see aLmAnn
Juliano & Stewart]. Schwab, The Sweep of Sexual Harassment Cases, 86 CoRNELL L. REv. 548,
592 (2001) (study finds that employers with harassment policies in place general avoid liability).
74.
See Sherwyn, supra note 59, at 1268-69.
75.
!d. Compare id., with Harper, supra note 55, at 46 (predicting that "placement of the
burden of proof' on the defendant might prove "critical to the outcome of a case in which
the trier of fact is uncertain about" either party's reasonableness), and Harper, supra note 55,
at 48 (" Faragher-Ellerth approach clarifies that when both the employer and the employee
victim have acted reasonably, the costs of the discriminatory harassment are to be imposed
on the employer.").
76.
There is no bright line between TEA and environmental cases, but rather a continuum. Cf Susan Estrich, Sex at Warit, 43 STAN. L. REv. 813, 834 (1991) (suggesting that the
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invoke the affirmative defense, the ramifications are serious.
Courts' readiness to conclude that there has been no TEA results
at best in excessive litigation on the affirmative defense issues, and
at worst (and quite frequently") in injustice for employees who are
victims of TEA's but whose employers escape liability entirely under an affirmative defense not intended for such cases.
A major cause of the under-identification of TEA cases is courts'
parsimonious definition of the TEA concept itself. 78 Some courts
import constrictive doctrinal developments from other areas of
Title VII, even where those developments do not logically fit the
harassment context.79 Other courts have relied on excerpts of the
Ellerth/Faragher text taken out of context to define TEA more nar80
rowly than the Ellerth/Faragher rationales in total would suggest.
Disagreement on the issue is understandable because the
Ellerth/Faragher Court articulated a TEA standard that is inconsistent with the Court's underlying rationale, which itself contains
internal inconsistencies.81 The Ellerth/Faragher rationale, moreover,
bespeaks a definition much broader than that suggested by some
82
of the examples the Court cites. Building on, or in tandem with,
distinction between quid pro quo and environmental harassment "takes the form of a continuum rather than a divide").
77.
See Shenvyn, supra note 59, at 1285--86 (documenting courts' frequent finding that
defendants have prevailed on the Ellerth defense, even where defendants fail to make any
showing at all on the second prong of the defense).
78.
Deficiencies in factual analysis may entail disaggregation. Courts treat situations
that in the aggregate , amount to TEA harassment (usually constructive discharge) as a series
of isolated occurrences, which appear trivial when viewed separately. SeeM. Isabel Medina A
Matter Of Fact: Hostile Environments and Summary Judgments, 8 S. CAL REV. L. & WOMEN's
STUD. 311, 341 (1999) (arguing that courts' disaggregation of claims and conduct results in
courts' seldom finding instances of hostility sufficient to support actionable hostile environment claims). See, e.g., Watkins v. Prort Sec. Bureau, Ltd., No. 98-2555, 1999 U.S. App.
LEXIS 29841 , at *13 (4th Cir. Nov. 15, 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1108 (2000) (finding no
connection between harassment and plaintiff's termination despite causal relationship between two). Hostile environment sexual harassment analysis is similarly fraught with such
"disaggregation."
79.
See Ribando v. United Airlines, Inc. 200 F.3d 507, 510-11 (7th Cir. 1999) (relying on
pre-Ellerth material adversity requirement to give content to Ellerth TEA standard) .
80.
See Harper, supra note 55, a t 64.
81.
See id. at 49 ("[T]he Court's use of common law agency principles was too formulaic, and its invocation of Title VII policy and precedent was to o truncated to be either fully
convincing or adequately explicative of the meaning of the structure to be applied to future
difficult cases.").
82.
In fact, different segments of the opinions suggest different rationales for the holdings. See id. Thus, the Ellerth opinion first suggests "looking to whether the discriminatory
action had a 'significant' impact on the victim's employment status," second, it stresses that
TEA's may be identified by virtue of the fact that they "'fall within the special province of
the supervisor,'" and finally that the TEA requires an official company act. See id. at 72
(quoting Ellerth, 524 U .S. at 761-62). Justice Souter's Faragher opinion does not cite cases,
but doe s cite to the Ellerth decision, which cites cases. 524 U.S. at 807.
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these ambiguities, lower courts have constricted the definition of
TEA. The remainder of this Article considers five analytical methods that have yielded these constrictions in the TEA concept:
1.
Importation into the harassment context of the
"materially adverse" or "ultimate employment action" concepts with which some courts have
curtailed discrimination claims outside the harassment context;
2.

Focusing on a single item in the Ellerth/Faragher list
of criteria to consider, to the exclusion of other
countervailing factors;

3.

Finding, in the Ellerth/Faragher realignment of categories, alterations of the standards operative within
the categories;
Recognizing TEA's only in cases in which the supervisor's action against the plaintiff is in retaliation for
the plaintiff's declining the supervisor's sexual advances, rather than in all cases in which harassment
culminates in a TEA;
Superimposition of retaliation doctrine onto harassment analysis.

4.

5.

A. Importation into the Harassment Context of the "Materially Adverse"
or "Ultimate Employment Action" Concepts, Which Some Courts
Have Imposed To Curtail Discrimination Claims
Outside The Harassment Context

Despite robust criticism from legal scholars, heightened injury
requirements have flourished in mainstream (non-harassment)
discrimination cases, particularly retaliation cases, and are now mi83
grating to the harassment context. In three of the federal circuits,
83.

Ribando v. United Airlines, Inc., 200 F.3d. 507, 511 (7th Cir. 1999) (relying on pre-

Ellerth material adversity requirement to give content to Ellerth TEA standard); Savino v. C.P.
Hall Co., 199 F. 3d 925, 932 (7th Cir. 1999) (TEA is akin to pre-Ellerth concept of adverse
employment action). But see Guillory v. S. Natural Gas Co., No. 99-2011, 2000 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 13171, at *5 (E.D. La. Sept. 6, 2000) (TEA is something less than an "ultimate employment decision"). The corollary is also at work. Some courts have imported into
mainstream discrimination doctrine the TEA concept developed by the Court for the
unique circumstance of harassment. See Watson v. Norton, No. 99-1450, 2001 U.S. App.
LEXIS 4962, at *21 (lOth Cir. Mar. 26, 2001) (citing Ellerth TEA definition to help define
"adverse employment action" actionable under section 704 retaliation); Evans v. Houston,
246 F.3d 344, 353 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Elkrth as demonstrative of requirements for
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mainstream discrimination plaintiffs (those invoking sections 703
and/ or 704 of Title VII) who succeed in proving they were victims
of discrimination nevertheless lose their cases if they fail to meet
84
these judicially imposed heightened injury requirements. A court
imposing such requirements insists that plaintiff prove that the action taken against her was "ultimate" or "materially adverse," in
addition to discriminatory. To meet this requirement, the plaintiff
usually must show that the challenged action formally altered her
85
relationship with the employer, whether by discharge, failure to
. 86 transter,
c
. 87
h tre,
or d emotion.
showing adverse action under section 704); Shackelford v. DeLoitte & Touche, 190 F.3d 398,
407 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing Ellerth for proposition that Title VII covers only adverse employment actions); Jones v. Wright State Univ., No. 98-4041, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 24334, *3
(6th Cir. Sept. 28, 1999) (citing Ellerth for proposition that section 703 race and sex discrimination plaintiff must allege material adverse employment action) ; Boone v. Goldin, 178
F.3d 253, 255 (4th Cir 1999) (citing E11erth for the proposition that Title VII, in general,
limits liability to cases of TEA). The latter migration poses similar threats to thwart the protections embodied in Title VII.
84.
Seejohnson v. Booker T. Washington Broad. Serv. Inc., 234 F.3d 501 , 512 (lith Cir.
2000); Savino v. Ha11, 199 F.3d 925, 933 n .8 (7th Cir. 1999); Ledergerber v. Stangler, 122 F.3d
1142 (8th Cir. 1997); Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 707-08 (5th Cir. 1997);
Spring v. Sheboygan Area Sch. Dist., 865 F.2d 883, 885 (7th Cir. 1989); Dorsch v. L.B. Foster
Co., 782 F.2d 1421, 1424 (7th Cir. 1986); Page v. Bolger, 645 F.2d 227, 233 (4th Cir. 1981).
See generally Ernest F. Lidge III, The Meaning ofDiscrimination: Why Courts Have Erred in Requiring Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs to Prove That the Employer's Action Was Materially Adverse
or Ultimate, 47 U. KAN. L. REv. 333, 348 (1999). But cf. Fierros v. Tex. Dep't of Health, 274

F.3d 187, 194 (5th Cir. 2001) (denial of pay increase constitutes adverse action for purposes
of section 704). Although the terms, "ultimate," and "materially adverse," may have slightly
different connotations, they share for present purposes that meaning that the plaintiff must
show a formal and harmful alteration in her worklife. Professor Rebecca White has observed
an increasing trend to impose such heightened harm requirements and suggested that the
"trend may well be a reaction to the explosion of employment discrimination claims crowding the dockets of the federal courts." Rebecca Hanner White, De Minimis Discrimination, 47
EMORY LJ. 1121, 1124 (1998) ; see also id. at 1126 (discussing confusion among courts on
whether and what severity of harm is required to meet the statutory elements of a discrimination claim and to create and inference sufficient to make a prima facie case of intent) ;
Anne Henry, Employer and Employee Reasonableness Regarding Retaliation under the
Ellerth/Faragher Affirmative Defense, 1999 U. Cm. LEGAL F. 553, 566 (1999) (noting that
Seventh, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits have relied on absence from section 704 retaliation
provision of language restricting adverse actions to those enumerated in section 703); Eric
M.D. Zion, Note, Overcoming Adversity: Distinguishing Retaliation from General Prohibitions Under
Federal Employment Discrimination Law, 76 IND. LJ. 191, 194 (2001) ("maJority of circuits do
not restrict section 704(a) 's language to such a reading but instead include lesser adverse
actions with some minimum level of substantiality").
85.
Cf Savino v. Hall, 199 F.3d 925,932 n.8 (7th Cir 1999) (requiring that employment
action "cause a substantial detriment to the plaintiff's employment relationship" in order to
qualify as TEA); Mattern v. Eastman Kodak, 104 F.3d 702, 708 (5th Cir. 1997) (defining adverse action to include hiring, granting leave, discharging, promoting and compensating) .
86.
Discriminatory failure to hire, of course, maintains a status quo that nondiscriminatory decisionmaking might have altered.
87.
Courts have imposed similarly heightened requirements entitled "adverse action"
and "materially adverse action," which have the same general effect of destroying otherwise
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The circuits have split on what kind of action is sufficiently se88
vere or important to violate section 704. Some courts, such as the
Fifth Circuit in the case of Mattern v. Eastman Kodak, 89 have restricted section 704 claims to "ultimate employment actions," such
90
as firing and denial of promotion. Such restrictive cases represent
91
the view of only a minority of federal circuits. The Fourth, Fifth
and Eighth Circuits have imposed the ultimate harm requirement
92
barrier to plaintiffs' retaliation claims. Other circuits recognize
valid Title VII claims. Lidge, supra note 84, at 368-73. Professor Lidge writes: "courts have
used the adverse action requirement to impose an additional substantive requirement on
plaintiffs. In doing so, they have rewritten the statute." /d. at 372-73; see alro Melissa A. Essary
& Terence D. Friedman, Retaliation Claims Under Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA: Untouchable
Emp[qyees, Uncertain Empfqyers, Unresolved Courts 63 Mo. L. REv. 115, 152 (1998) (noting that
Title VII language not restricted to ultimate decisions). In Empluyer and Empluyee Reasonableness Regarding Retaliation under the Ellerth/Faragher Affirmative Defense, Ann Henry argues
that the requirement of some courts that plaintiff suffer an "ultimate" employment action to
bring a 704 retaliation claim conflicts with the Ellerth/Faragher requirement that the victim
use the employer's channels to report the environmental harassment. Henry, supra note 84,
at 554-55.
88.
See Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1243 (9th Cir. 2000) (describing split in circuits: Fifth and Eight Circuits recognize only ultimate employment actions as cognizable
under section 704; First, Seventh, Ninth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits take expansive view of
adverse employment actions; Second and Third take intermediate position); Wideman v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 141 F.3d 1453, 1456 (11th Cir. 1998) (describing split in the circuits:
Eighth and Fifth circuits limit retaliation claims to ultimate employment actions, while First,
Ninth, and Tenth allow retaliation claims for actions falling short of ultimate employment
actions); White, supra note 84, at 1142-45.
89.
104 F.3d 702, 708 (5th Cir. 1997).
90.
Walker v. Glasfloss, 214 F.3d 615, 629 (5th Cir. 2000) (requiring that adverse employment actions be "ultimate" in order to be cognizable under section 704 of Title VII) .
Professor Rebecca White traces the problem to the Fourth Circuit's reliance on language
contained in a separate section of Title VII (section 717, which governs the federal government as employer) to decide on the meaning of the very different language in the section
704 prohibition against discrimination. See White, supra note 84, at 1136-41. It is ironic that
the ultimate employment decision requirement that migrated from section 717 through
section 704 and now to section 703 harassment, was imposed by the Fifth Circuit because, in
its view, section 703(a) ( 1) excludes the "vague harms" contemplated in section 703(a) (2).
Mattern, 104 F.3d at 707-08. The "terms and conditions of employment" described in section
703 (a) ( 1) are precisely the bases for the Supreme Court's Meritur conclusion that hostile
environment harassment is actionable under Title VII. Clearly, section 703(a)(l) is not limited to ultimate employment actions. See generally Lidge, supra note 84, at 358-68.
91.
See Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d at 1243 (only Fifth and Eight circuits limit retaliation claims to ultimate employment actions); Burger v. Cent. Apartment Mgmt., Inc., 168
F.3d 875, 878 n.3 (5th Cir. 1999) (noting that strict ultimate employment action standard of
the Fifth Circuit is minority position in Federal Circuit courts); Wideman, 141 F.3d at 1456
(only Fifth and Eighth circuits limit retaliation claims to ultimate employment actions).
92.
See Cottman v. Rubin, No. 01-1545, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 8635, at *6 (4th Cir. May
3, 2002) (no retaliation claim absent ultimate employment action); Mattern, 104 F.3d at 707
("Title VII was designed to address ultimate employment decisions, not to allow every decision that might have some tangential effect upon those ultimate decisions" (quoting Dollis v.
Rubin, 77 F.3d 777, 781--82 (5th Cir. 1995))); Munday v. Stangler, 126 F.3d at 239, 243 (8th
Cir. 1997) (Title VII applies to discrimination only if it affects an ultimate employment decision) (citing Harlston v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 37 F.3d 379, 382 (8th Cir. 1994));
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that Title VII protects against employment discrimination in all its
93
many guises. These courts have allowed section 704 claims for the
full spectrum of retaliatory behaviors, regardless of whether those
94
behaviors rose to the level of "ultimate employment actions."
Thus, the Eleventh Circuit, in Wideman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
found a cognizable adverse employment action when plaintiff's
manager "reprimanded her, delayed authorizing medical treatment, and asked co-workers to give negative statements about the
95
plain tiff. "
The ultimate harm requirement conflicts with the language of
Title VII and with Supreme Court precedent.96 The language of
section 704, prohibiting retaliation against those seeking to enforce rights under Title VII, simply makes it "an unlawful
employment practice for an employer to discriminate' on the basis
of an employee's opposing practices that violate Title VII or par97
ticipating in procedures to challenge such practices. Yet the
leading appellate court decision requiring ultimate action, the
Fifth Circuit's Mattern v. Eastman Kodak decision read the term "discriminate" to require that the employer's retaliatory act consist of
an "ultimate employment decision," rather than "an 'interlocutory
Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745, 755 (4th Cir. 1996) (stating that absent
discharge, there is insufficient adverse action to support retaliation claim); see Elana Olson,
Beyond the Scope of Empluyer Liability: Empluyer Failure to Address Retaliation l¥y Co-Workers After
Title VII Protected Activity, 7 WM. & MARY j. OF WoMEN & L. 239, 258 (2000).
93.
See Wideman, 141 F.3d at 1456 (citing Wyatt v. City of Boston, 35 F.3d 13, 15-16 (1st
Cir. 1994); Berry v. Stevinson Chevrolet, 74 F.3d 980, 984-86 (lOth Cir. 1996)); Yartzoff v.
Thomas, 809 F.2d 1371, 1375 (9th Cir. 1987)); Olson, supra note 92, at 258.
94.
See, e.g., Henry, supra note 84, at 566 n.64 (describing cases that recognize retaliation claims in absence of ultimate employment action).
95.
Ann M. Henry, Empluyer and Empll.ryee Reasonableness Regarding Retaliation under the
Ellerth/Faragher Affirmative Defense, 1999 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 553,562 (1999); see Wideman, 141
F.3d at 1456 (citing Wyatt, 35 F.3d at 15-16; Berry v. Stevinson Chevrolet, 74 F.3d at 984-86;
Yartzoffv. Thomas, 809 F.2d at 1375); Olson, supra note 92, at 258.
See Wideman, 141 F."3d at 1456 (plain language of section 704 imposes no ultimate
96.
employment action requirement).
97.
In pertinent part, section 704 states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against
any of his employees ... because [the employee) has opposed any practice made an
unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge,
testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or
hearing under this subchapter.

42 U.S.C § 2000e-3(a) (emphasis added).
Some authors have argued that the lack of qualifier in this text renders actionable a
broader range of employer acts than are actionable under section 703. See Zion, supra note
84, at 198; cf Essary & Friedman, supra note 87, at 141 ("anti-retaliation provision, which is
not limited to a specific definition, as is the substantive discrimination provision, may be
construed more broadly than the substantive anti-discrimination provisions").
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or mediate' decision which can lead to an ultimate decision."98 The
Mattern court drew this conclusion largely from identical language
in section 703, which is the statute's general prohibition against
99
discrimination. The Mattern court distinguished between the two
essential elements of section 703. One prohibits all discrimination
in employment decisions, including those pertaining to compensation, terms, conditions and privileges of employment; the other
forbids limiting, segregating, or classifying workers in a way that
tends to deprive an individual of opportunities or adversely affect
100
empl oyment status.
The Fifth Circuit's Mattern decision relied on the distinctions between these two subsections of section 703 to justifY an
insupportable reading of section 704. To define the term, "discriminate" in section 704, the Mattern court looked to the use of
101
that term in section 703(a) (1). The court concluded that the
term "discriminate" in section 703(a)(l) is much narrower than
section 703 (a) (2) 's language "limiting employees in ways that tend
102
to deprive them of opportunities. " The court then leaped to the
conclusion that because " [ t] he anti-retaliation provision[, like section 703(a) (1 ),] speaks only of "discrimination" [without mention]
of the vague harms contemplated in [703](a)(2), [section 704

98.
Mattern, 104 F.3d at 708. Mattern is one of the earliest and most significant circuit
court decisions to impose an ultimate employment requirement. The Mattern court drew
upon two earlier decisions, neither of which squarely stood for the proposition that section
704 retaliation claims are limited to ultimate employment actions. One was the Fourth Circuit case of Page v. Bolger, 645 F.2d 227 (4th Cir. 1981), which construed the term "personnel
action" in section 717 of Title VII (governing suits against the federal government) to mean
ultimate employment action. /d. at 233. The other was the Fifth Circuit's own earlier decision in Dollis v. Rubin, 77 F.3d 777 (5th Cir. 1995), which relied on Page to require ultimate
employment actions to challenge a federal personnel action under section 717.
99.
104 F.3d at 708-09.
100. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
(a)
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer( 1)

to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin; or

(2)

to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive
any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such
individual's color, religion, sex, or national origin.

/d.

101.
102.

104 F.3d at 708-09.
!d.
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must] be read to exclude such vague harms, and to include only
103
ultimate employment decisions."
The problem with the court relying on section 703(a) (1) in this
way is that section 703(a) (1) itself does not in any way limit actionable claims to ultimate employment actions. In fact, the Supreme
Court rejected precisely this narrowing construction of section
703 (a) (1) in its 1986 Meritor decision. When the Meritor Court recognized that section 703(a) (1) allows a claim for hostile
environment harassment, it expressly rejected the argument that
section 703(a) (1) imposes any ultimate decision requirement, 104
concluding that: "[T] he language of Title VII is not limited to
"'economic'" or "tangible" discrimination. The phrase "'terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment' " evinces a congressional
intent '"to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of
. emp1oyment. ,105
men and women ,, In
The language of the statute, as construed by the Supreme Court,
thus imposes no limits on actionability of discrimination under section 703(a) (1), as long as the discrimination affects a term,
condition, or privilege of employment, which need not be of economic or ultimate consequence, but may instead be "merely"
106
environmental or mediate. Given the absence from the statutory

103. Id.
104. 477 U.S. 57, 58 (1986) (citing Los Angeles Dep't of Water and Power v. Manhart,
435 u.s. 702 (1978)) .
105. Id. at 64. The statute and legislative history do not define the term "discrimination." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1; Robert Brookins, A Rose By Any Other Name .. . The Gender Basis Of
Same-Sex Sexual Harassment, 46 DRAKE L. REv. 441,499 (1998) . In Faragher, the Court stated:
We have repeatedly made clear that although the statute mentions specific employment decisions with immediate consequences, the scope of the prohibition " 'is not
limited to "economic" or "tangible" discrimination,'" Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,
510 U.S. 17 (1993) (quoting Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64), and that it covers more than
" ' terms' and 'conditions' in the narrow contractual sense." Oncale v. Sundowner Off
shore Services, Inc., 523 U .S. 75, 78 (1998).
524 U.S. at 786.
106. On the meaning of the term "discrimination, Professor Gudel has written:
Title VII does not define "discrimination.'' However, it does provide that only certain
kinds of discrimination are unlawful-namely, those engaged in "because of' one of
the bases specified in the Act. One must understand "discrimination," then, despite
its normally pejorative connotation, as a neutral term in Title VII. Discrimination
simply means treating some employees differently from others. Of course, employers
treat some employees differently from others every day-some are fired while others
are not, some are promoted or given raises while others are not, some applicants are
hired while others are turned away. None of these "discriminations" are illegal. The
only illegal discriminations are those made "because of' race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin. Therefore, the entire task of elaborating the substantive reach of
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text of any heightened harm restrictions and the Supreme Court's
express rejection of the heightened harm requirements, the lower
courts' persistence in imposing such requirements is bizarre. It is
not surprising, therefore, that legal scholars have consistently ar107
gued against heightened harm requirements.
Perhaps the most telling evidence that section 704 retaliation
claims are not limited to ultimate actions is implicit in the Su108
preme Court's 1997 decision in Robinson v. Shell OiL In Robinson,
the Court confronted the question of whether section 704 reaches
retaliation against former employees. The plaintiff in Robinson, a
former Shell Oil employee, alleged that Shell Oil retaliated against
Robinson after the termination of Robinson's employment, by giving a negative reference in connection with Robinson's application
109
for a position with a different employer. The Supreme Court
held that a current employer-employee relationship between the
plaintiff and the defendant is not a prerequisite to a retaliation
claim under section 704. Because the negative impact of retaliation
in post-employment cases like Robinson's necessarily is on the
plaintiff's employment relationship with a potential future employer, rather than with the defendant, section 704 necessarily
encompasses retaliatory measures that do not in the least affect

Title VII-the task of determining exactly which actions violate the statute and which
do not-hinges upon the interpretation of the phrase "because of."
Paul J. Gudel, Beyond Causation: The Interpretation of Action and the Mixed Motives Problem in
EmpluymentDiscriminationLaw, 70TEx. L. REv. 17,21-22 (1991).
107. See gent?rally Ernest Lidge, supra note 84, and Rebecca Hannt?r l-Vhite, supra note 84.
Cf Essary & Friedman, supra note 87, at 135-37. Essary & Friedman note that:
[C]ourts employing the strict ultimate employment decision standard, have relied
expressly on the Fourth Circuit's decision in Page v. Bolgt?ras the genesis of their holdings. However, these courts' exclusive reliance on Page is misplaced, most
fundamentally so because Page simply did not concern an anti-retaliation clause.
Rather, Page addressed a plaintiff's attempt to rewrite the prima facie case requirements in a failure-to-promote case brought under 42 U.S.CA. § 2000e-16(a), a
particular section of Title VII which deals only with discrimination in federal employment and which itself requires that there be a "personnel action," not merely
"discrimination."
/d. at 135-36 (citations omitted).
108. 519 U .S. 337 (1997); see joel Kravetz, Deterrence v. Material Harm: Finding the A~
priate Standard to Define an "Adverse Action" in Retaliation Claims Brought Under the Applicabk
Equal Employment opportunity Statutes, 4 U . PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 315, 363-64 (2002) (relying
on Robinson in argument that section 704 adverse employment action should receive broad
construction).
109. Robinson, 519 U.S. at 338.
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(ultimately or otherwise) the relationship between the defending
employer and the plaintiff-employee. 110
By definition, the ultimate employment action requirement is
inconsistent with Robinson. In setting forth the specifics of the ultimate action requirement, the Mattern court stated that "Title VII's
anti-retaliation provision refers to ultimate employment decisions,
and not to an 'interlocutory or mediate' decision which can lead to an ul111
timate decision." A negative reference or any other negative action
by a fOT71'lCY' employer cannot constitute an ultimate decision, inasmuch as the former employer has no power to take ultimate action
against someone no longer on its payroll. One district court in the
Fifth Circuit, the source of the Mattern ultimate action requirement, construed the ultimate requirement in combination with the
Robinson rule to permit former employees to sue their former employers for retaliation only if the retaliatory act would affect
prospective future employers' ultimate decisions about that ernployee.112 This lower court concluded that a negative reference
letter sent in retaliation for plaintiff's protected acts did not
amount to an adverse employment action cognizable under section
704 because the letter did not result in the potential employer taking ultimate action against the plaintiff. 113 The district court's
valiant effort to reconcile Mattern and Robinson was destined to fail
because Mattern forbids retaliation suits for mediate actions, and a
former employer's action is necessarily mediate, capable of harming the plaintiff only by influencing a decision by the future
114
emp1oyer.
110.

See Bernofsky v. Tulane Educal. Fund, No. 98-1792, 2000 U .S. Dist. Lexis 5561, at
(E.D. La. April 18, 2000) (suggesting that Fifth Circuit should revisit the Mattern rule
in light of Robinson). But see Forde v. Brinker Rest. Corp., No. 3:96-CV-1994-D, 1998 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 6277, at *6 n.2 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 19, 1998) (rejecting argument that Robinson should
alter the Mattern requirement that retaliation plaintiffs show ultimate employment action).
111. Mattern, 104 F.3d at 708 (emphasis added).
112. Bemojsky, 2000 U.S. Dist. Lexis 5561, at *1~19.
113. /d.. But see Hecht v. GAF Corp., 95 Civ. 10379 (RPP), 1999 U .S. Dist. LEXIS 5946, at
*10 (S.D.N.Y Apr. 28, 1999) (when EMPLOYER has refused to provide a reference, it would
be a fool's errand to require plaintiff to show exactly how further adverse job consequences-i.e., impediments to obtaining future employmenlr-were affected by this refusal).
The Bemofsky court tempered the Robinson rule that the no-longer employed may sue their
former employees with the Mattern rule that only ultimate employment actions can give rise
to retaliation claims by requiring that the plaintiff show that the adverse action affected an
ultimate employment decision in connection with future employment for which the plaintiff
was applying. The Bemofsky court also suggested, however, that the Fifth Circuit could profitably revisit the Mattern decision, with an aim to easing the ultimate employment action
requirement. 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5561, at *18.
114. In fact, a court's finding actionable harm by virtue of the effect of discrimination
on a plaintiff's relationship with an employer other than the defendant is not entirely without precedent. See Sibley Memorial Hospital v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
*1~19
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The EEOC Compliance Manual also rejects heightened harm
requirements:
Some courts have held that the retaliation proVIsiOns apply
only to retaliation that takes the form of ultimate employment
actions. Others have construed the provisions more broadly,
but have required that the action materially affect the terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment.
The Commission disagrees with those decisions and concludes that such constructions are unduly restrictive. The
statutory retaliation clauses prohibit any adverse treatment
that is based on a retaliatory motive and is reasonably likely to
deter the charging party or others from engaging in protected
activity. Of course, petty slights and trivial annoyances are not
actionable, as they are not likely to deter protected activity.
More significant retaliatory treatment, however, can be challenged regardless of the level of harm. As the [N] inth Circuit
has stated, the degree of harm suffered by the individual
"goes to the issue of damages, not liability."u:.
Critics contend that heightened harm requirements confuse the
elements of the statutory cause of action with the elements of the
116
McDonnell Douglas prima facie case, a proof structure that was devised for cases in which the plaintiff lacks direct evidence of motive
or intent. 117 Professor "White has argued, for example, that the materiality or ultimate employment action requirement is not
appropriate when injected as an element of the statutory claim, but
may be appropriate in cases where the plaintiff is using circumstantial evidence under McDonnell Douglas to create an inference of
(by using term "person aggrieved," rather than "employee," statute extends beyond employer-employee relationships).
115. 115 EEOC Compliance Manual (CCH) § 8, 146 (1998) (citations omitted).
116. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 ( 1973)
117. See Gilligan v. Jamco Dev. Corp., 108 F. 3d 246, 250 (9th Cir. 1997) (" McDonnell
Douglas/Burdine elements irrelevant if plaintiff advances direct evidence of discrimination.");
Lidge, supra note 84, at 348; White, supra note 84 at 1142-45; see also Kormoczy v. United
States Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev., 53 F.3d 821 , 824 (7th Cir. 1995) ("Where direct evidence is used to show that a housing decision was made in violation of the statute, the
burden shifting analysis is inapposite."); Lowe v. City of Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998, 1006 (9th
Cir. 1985) ("plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment without satisfying the McDonnell Douglas test.") ; Wooten v. Acme Steel Co, 986 F. Supp. 524, 527 (N.D. Ill.
1997) (distinguishing betwee n statutory elements and McDonnell Douglas prima facie case);
Frank Lopez, Using the Fair Housing A ct to Combat Predatory Lending, 6 GEO. J. ON Pov. L. &
PoL'Y 73, 99 n.201 (stating that the "validity of a fair housing complaint should be judged by
the statutory e lements of an FHA claim rather than the structure of the prima facie case").

SUMMER 2002]

After Ellerth

835

discriminatory intent or motive. Under McDonnell Douglas, courts
give such plaintiffs the benefit of the doubt, permitting an inference of discriminatory intent in the absence of direct evidence, but
only if the action in question is sufficiently adverse or ultimate to
look suspicious. The differences between the statutory elements
and the McDonnell Douglas elements are significant, as are the
118
ramifications of the plaintiff's proving them. The McDonnell
Douglas proof scheme goes only to the statutory element of
119
intent. The statutory elements, once proven, entitle the plaintiff
to relief, unless the defendant proves, by a preponderance of the
120
evidence, all of the elements of an affirmative defense. Thus, as a
rule the plaintiff who proves the elements of the statutory claim,
wins her case. Under McDonnell Douglas, by contrast, the plaintiff's
proof of the prima facie elements simply shifts to the defendant a
burden of production to introduce evidence of a legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action. The heightened
harm requirements may be legitimate elements of proof for
plaintiffs who wish to take advantage of the McDonnell Douglas
presumption because they lack direct evidence of discriminatory
motive, but they should not be injected as statutory elements for
plaintiffs who are not invoking the McDonnell Douglas
118. Gilligan, 108 F.3d at 249; see also Latimore v. Citibank Fed. Sav. Bank, 151 F.3d 712,
715 (7th Cir. 1998) (stating that "[i]t is always open to a plaintiff in a discrimination case to
show in a conventional way, without relying on any special doctrines of burden-shifting, that
there is enough evidence, direct or circumstantial, of discrimination to create a triable issue."); Ring v. First Interstate Mortgage, Inc., 984 F.2d 924, 926 (8th Cir. 1993). The failure
to plead the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case does not mean that the plaintiff would be
unable to advance direct evidence of discrimination, in which case the prima facie case is
irrelevant. Gilligan 108 F.3d at 250. The McDonnell Douglas case simply allows a plaintiff who
Jacks direct evidence of discriminatory motive to avoid summary judgment or judgment as a
matter of law. If plaintiff proves the elements of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case, she
avoids summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law on the issue of intent, forcing the
defendant to put in its case. Defendant can neutralize the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case
by producing evidence of a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason . McDonnell Douglas 411 U.S.
at 802.
119. The plaintiff's proving the elements of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case has
the effect not merely of permitting the inference that the defendant was motivated by discrimination, but actually establishes "a legally mandatory, rebuttable presumption" that the
defendant was so motivated. O'Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 312
(1996); Texas Dep't ofCmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-56 (1981).
120. The only statutory affirmative defense to intentional discrimination under Title VII
is the bona fide occupational qualification defense. See Int'l Union v. Johnson Controls, 499
U.S. 187, 201 (1991). Defendant may also reduce its monetary liability by proving that it
would have made the same decision in the absence of the discriminatory motive, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e, or by demonstrating that, after-acquired evidence would have caused it to make the
same decision if it had known. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 36263 (1995). In the harassment context, of course, the Ellerth/Faragher decisions have added
the affirmative defense, which does not undo the fact of the violation, but exempts the employer from remedying it.
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are not invoking the McDonnell Douglas presumption. It is especially inappropriate for courts to add such extra hurdles under
statutes whose remedial nature calls for liberal construction. Court
activism to give access to statutory protection is consistent with
statutory purpose. Court activism to curtail access is not.
If heightened hann requirements are unfounded, then arguments importing the heightened hann requirements whole cloth
122
to give content to the TEA concept are similarly flawed. Despite
critiques, courts that have adopted heightened harm requirements
in retaliation cases under section 704 have begun to adopt the requirement in TEA analysis under section 703, as well. 123
Admittedly, arguments can be made that, wrong as such heightened hann requirements may be in the straight Title VII context,
they are-for some reason-proper in defining TEA's in the discrete context of determining availability of the Ellerth/Faragher
affirmative defense for harassment cases. As discussed below, however, the language of Ellerth/Faragher counsels against importing
heightened hann doctrine into harassment jurisprudence. Courts
that subscribe to the heightened harm requirement (and some
that do not) understandably have imported that concept into the
124
TEA context. Indeed, Justice Kennedy's Ellerth opinion cited,
though declined to approve the results in, several cases in which
125
courts had imposed heightened hann requirements. Justice
Souter's Faragher opinion, though referring with approval to the
Ellerth opinion, made no independent references to these stringent
121. See White, supra note 84, at 1142-45, 1171-82. Needless to say, standing doctrines
protect against pursuit of claims involving no injury, and presumably require that plaintiffs
show hann in order to proceed. Title VII, by its terms (by its silence, actually) leaves to the
victim of discrimination to decide whether the effects hurt enough to warrant litigation. The
scope of standing under Title VII is identical to that of Article III standing generally. W. Carl
Jordan, Employment Discrimination Law, 1998 SuPP., A B.A. SEc. LABOR & EMPLOYMENT L. 420
(citing cases); see also Lidge, supra note 84, at 348; White, supra note 84, at 1142-45, 11711182. Professor Lidge traces courts' misplaced reliance on precedent to develop a heightened hann requirement. He explains that courts' requiring a showing of material adversity
confuses issues of how to prove intent with issues of statutory coverage. Professor Lidge has
argued that the heightened harm requirements began simply as shorthand for the requirement in 703(a) (1) that the employer discriminate in the terms, conditions or privileges of
employment, rather than as an independent requirement that plaintiff prove a certain degree of harm. Lidge, supra note 84, at 348.
122. Cf Watts v. Kroger Co., 170 F.3d 505,510 n.5 {5th Cir. 1999) (declining to decide
whether the Ellerth TEA and the Mattern ultimate employment action are equivalents).
123. See Bemofsky, 2000 U.S. Dist. Lexis 5561, at *16-19; Reinhold v. Virginia, 151 F.3d
172, 174-75 (4th Cir. 1998) (applying Ellerth to find no tangible employment action in the
absence of ultimate alteration in job status the plaintiff) .
124. Ribando v. United Airlines, Inc., 200 F.3d 507, 511 (7th Cir. 1999) (relying on preEllerth material adversity requirement to give content to Ellerth TEA standard).
125. 524 U.S. 742, 761 (citing Crady v. Liberty Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 993 F.2d 132, 136
(7th Cir. 1993), and other cases limiting the scope ofTitle VII).
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126

appellate court cases. In fact, however, both the language and
rationale of the Ellerth/Faragher decisions counsel against heightened harm as a test for whether the supervisor's act is a TEA.
The language of the opinions includes an articulation of factors
for identifying TEA's that suggests a definition far broader than
merely ultimate employment actions. In particular, the Court, in
listing factors relevant to the TEA assessment, stated that neither
causation of economic harm nor report to and review by higher
management, constituted necessary conditions to an action being a
127
TEA. Yet, economic harm and reporting to upper management
are the hallmarks of the ultimate employment action concept. If an
employment action can qualify as a TEA without having economic
consequences and without being reported to upper management,
then employment actions need not be ultimate in order to be
TEA's.
Like the Ellerth/Faragher textual description of the concept, the
Court's underlying rationale suggests that the TEA concept encompasses far more than ultimate employment actions. The
Ellerth/Faragher Court viewed its overarching task to be the integration of agency law principles with the objectives of Title VII in the
128
development of a standard for employer liability for harassment.
The Court began by considering each of the potential grounds for
vicarious liability set forth in REsTATEMENT OF THE LAw OF AGENCY
§ 219! 29 Of the RESTATEMENT subsections at issue, the Court
viewed two as potentially applicable to imputation of supervisor
harassment to the employer: "within the scope of employment"
130
and "aided by the agency relationship." The Court gave two reasons for selecting the latter in preference to the former: ( 1) agency
law is not consistent on the issue of whether harassment is or is not
within the scope of employment, so would give no answer anyway;
and (2) if harassment (which certainly appears in no job descriptions!) is within the scope of supervisor authority, it would also be
within the scope of co-worker authority, and yet employers have
never been vicariously liable for co-worker harassment in the absence of employer negligence.•s• By contrast, the "aided by the

126. 524 U.S. at 808. In fact, justice Souter includes in a list of TEA's "undesirable reassignment," along with discharge and demotion. /d.
127. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761.
128. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 802 n.3.
129. Id. at 793-804.
130. ld. at 793, 801.
131. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 799-802. The Faragher Court acknowledged that "supervisors
have special authority enhancing their capacity to harass, and that the employer can guard
against their misbehavior more easily because their numbers are by definition fewer than
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agency relationship" prong of the RESTATEMENT Section 219 standard has the advantage of distinguishing between supervisor and
132
co-worker harassers. While the agency relationship helps both
supervisors and co-workers in the sense that it gives them proximity
to the victim, it helps the supervisor more because:
[a] n employee generally cannot check a supervisor's abusive
conduct the same way that she might deal with abuse from a
co-worker. When a fellow employee harasses, the victim can
walk away or tell the offender where to go, but it may be difficult to offer such responses to a supervisor, whose "power to
supervise-which may be to hire and fire, and to set work
schedules and pay rates--does not disappear . . . when he
chooses to harass through insults and offensive gestures,
rather than directly with threats of firing or promises of pro.
"133
moon.
tl
In essence, the Court proceeded under the "aided by the agency
relationship" standard because that standard can accommodate
the crucial difference between supervisor and co-worker harassers.
Although the agency relationship empowers both types of harassers, since both gain access to their victims by virtue of their jobs,
only the supervisor is empowered to take employment actions
against the victim, which power allows the supervisor (but not the
co-worker harasser) to intimidate the subordinate into submitting
134
to the harassment. The Ellerth/Faragher Court thus selected the
TEA as the critical indicator that the harasser was indeed "misusing
supervisory authority" because it wanted to preserve the traditional
135
rule that rejects strict liability for co-worker harassment. Because
supervisors (for whose harassment employers should be strictly liable) are, by definition, wielders of power that employers delegate
to them to take legitimate TEA's against subordinates and because
co-equal employees by definition lack that power, the occurrence

the numbers of regular employees," but "because of the virtues of categorical clarity," chose
to analyze the issue under the aided by the agency relationship standard. /d. at 800-01.
132. !d. at 803.
133. /d. at 803 (quoting Estrich, supra note 76, at 854).
134. The nature of the affirmative defense mirrors this foundation of the distinction between TEA and environmental liability. The affirmative defense is available in the
environmental case because, in the words of the Faragher Court: "Whether the agency relation aids in commission of supervisor harassment which does not culminate in a TEA is less
obvious." /d. at 763.
135. /d. at 804.
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of a TEA is a bright-line test for determining whether or not the
136
harasser was aided by the agency relationship.
The Ellerth/Faragher Court defined TEA's as actions in which the
supervisor necessarily employs powers delegated by the employer.
A TEA thus is an action that only a supervisor has the power to
take. If a co-equal employee could have done the deed, the deed
does not qualify. This is the crux of the TEA definition. The Court
drew the essential demarcation between TEA's and nonTEA/ environmental cases in order to exclude co-worker harassment cases from the rule of uniform imputation. The key, then, is
not so much the dimension of the action taken against the subordinate, but the source of the power the supervisor uses to take that
action. If that power is derived from the authority the supervisor
derives from his relationship with the employer, the action taken is
a TEA, regardless of whether it alters the subordinate's status in an
ultimate sense. If the power is nothing more than the power that
any employee receives from being included in the workplace, then
the action is not a TEA.

B. Focusing On A Single Item In The Ellerth/Faragher List of Criteria
To Consider, Rather Than Considering All Factors

In Ellerth/Faragher, the Supreme Court identified qualities that
characterize an act as a TEA. A TEA
1. "falls within the special province of the supervisor,
[who] has been empowered by the company as a
distinct class of agent to make economic decisions

136. The Court rejected a test tha t would have found the supervisor to have been aided
by the agency relationship only where the supervisor expressly and affirmative used delegated authority because it would under-identify TEA's. /d. at 805. The Court believed that
such a test would fail to capture some instances in which supervisors were discrete enough
that the fact that they were affirmatively using such power would be difficult to detect. /d. at
804. The tendency of courts and commentators to create or construe substantive employment discrimination law in ways that cut off protections for the express objective of avoiding
burdens on courts and the EEOC is odd. Substantive employment discrimination rights are
not luxuries to be curtailed when their protection is inconvenient any more than the criminal laws against drug-use or dealing are to be toned down because of court burdens. The
Faragher Court, in explaining why it was drawing the line benveen TEA cases (absolute liability) and environmental cases (voidable liability) characterized cases on the absolute liability
side of the divide thus: "There is nothing remarkable in the fact that claims against employers for discriminatory employment actions with tangible results, like hiring, firing,
promotion , compensation, and work assignment, have resulted in employer liability once
the discrimination was shown." /d. at 790.
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affecting other employees under his or her control"·137
'

2.

"[is] the means by which the supervisor brings the
official power of the enterprise to bear on subordinates"; 138

3.

requires an official act of the enterprise, a company
act;
4.
constitutes a significant change in employment
status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment
with
significantly
different
responsibilities, denial of a raise or a decision causing a significant change in benefits;
in most cases inflicts direct economic harm;
5.
6.
in most cases is documented in official company records, and may be subject to review by higher level
.
139
supemsors.
By their terms, the first four of these factors are essential conditions to finding an act to be a TEA. The last two, economic harm
and documentation/review, are typical, but not inevitable, characteristics of a TEA. 140 By treating these two traits in this way, the
Court evinced an intent that decision makers engage in analysis
responsive to the context. For example, there may be cases where
the employee is NOT harmed economically, but in which it is nev141
ertheless decided that the supervisor's act constitutes a TEA.
Likewise, there may be situations in which the action taken is not
reported and does not receive higher management's imprimatur,
but is nevertheless a TEA. The opportunity for upper management
137. EUerth, 524 U.S. at 762.
138. !d.
139. !d. at 761-62.
140. Although economic harm often received emphasis in prior case law, see Crady v.
Liberty Nat'!. Bank & Trust Co., 993 F.2d 132, 136 (7th Cir. 1993), post-EUerth courts have
observed the Supreme Court's caution that economic harm is not a necessary condition for
the finding of a TEA. See johnson v. Booker T. Washington Broad. Serv. Inc., 234 F.3d 501,
513 (11th Cir. 2000) (fact of economic harm is dispositive in favor of finding TEA, but, absent economic hann, fact-finder must assess whether reasonable person would have found
transfer to constitute TEA); Reinhold v. Virginia, 151 F.3d 172 (4th Cir. 1998); Sanchez v.
Denver Pub. Sch., 164 F.3d 527, 532 (lOth Cir. 1998);jeffries v. State of Kansas, 147 F.3d
1220, 1232 (lOth Cir. 1998); Bonora v. UGI Utils., Inc., No. 99-5539, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15172, *18-22 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 18, 2000) (absence of economic harm not dispositive of TEA
issue); Kause v. Alberto-Culver Co., No. 97 C3085, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10986 (N.D. Ill.
June 28, 2000); Steven D. Baderian, et al., Symposium: Managing Empluyment Risks In Light Of
The New Rulings In Sexual Harassment Law 21 W. NEw ENG. L. REv. 343, 361 (1999).
141. Cf United States v. Grimes, 244 F.3d 375 (5th Cir 2001); United States v. Carroll,
190 F.3d 290 (5th Cir. 2000); SEC v. Palmisano, 135 F.3d 860 (2d Cir. 1998).
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to review may be crucial in many cases, but will not be helpful in
other cases. Nevertheless, Professor Michael Harper has argued
that the last listed factor, "documentation and opportunity for review," is the only one that really matters, and has advocated
limiting TEA's to those supervisor acts that are "recorded or reported," and that receive the higher management's imprimatur! 42
Professor Harper's article responds to a perceived want of per143
suasive supporting rationale in the Ellerth/Faragher opinions.
Harper sets out to supply a policy analysis to correct the opinions'
"formulaic" use of agency principles and truncated invocation of
Title VII policy and precedent, which leave the opinion neither
"convincing" nor "adequately explicative of the meaning of the
144
structure to be applied to future difficult cases." The primary
purpose of his article is to supply rationale and policy justifications
in support of the Ellerth/Faragher decision to allow the defense in
non-TEA cases. 145 In Harper's view, the reason why allowing defendants an affirmative defense in environmental harassment cases
makes sense is that victims of non-TEA harassment can "prevent
discrimination at lower cost than controlling management," except
where management has failed to make accessible safe channels for
46
employees to complain! According to Harper, upper management can, with little cost, control discrimination in formal job
actions "because such decisions have been made available for review and have been effectively passed on or acquiesced [in] by
•
semor
management. "147
Relying on the sound rationale that he has supplied for the
Court's decision, Harper then argues that TEA's should be limited
to those job actions as to which "the discriminating supervisor has
recorded or reported his discriminatory action so that it is readily
available for review." 148 Professor Harper states that "employers are
lower cost-avoiders of discriminatory actions that are overt and thus
subject to review; employee victims may be lower cost avoiders only
14
of covert actions that have not been reported to management. " \J
142. Harper, supra note 55, at 75.
143. /d. at 41.
144. /d. at 49.
145. ld.
146. /d. at 64.
147. /d. at 66.
148. /d. at 75.
149. /d. at 75 (emphasis added). In fact, the supposed dichotomy is no t inevitable.
Thus, the discriminating supervisor may, knowing that his bias motivates a hiring decision ,
be especially diligent in documenting the nondiscriminatory justifications for the decision,
or the harassing supervisor may be quite obvious when engaging in harassment so severe or
pervasive that it creates an actionably hostile environment.
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Although Professor Harper's rationale supplies a good argument
for including in the TEA category actions that are official and on
the record, it does not warrant excluding actions that are not on
the record. Other cost-based rationales can be made for the
Court's line drawing. Cost-avoidance arguments can also be made
for including as TEA's actions that make use of delegated authority, regardless of whether or not they receive review at higher levels.
Professor Harper's argument focuses on post-TEA correction and
employer opportunity to correct actions that are official and on the
record. A similar cost-avoidance argument can be made for preTEA cost-avoidance. The employer is capable of and responsible
for cost-avoidance in hiring and training supervisors in how to use
the power delegated to them in a nondiscriminatory way.

C. Finding in the Ellerth/Faragher Realignment of Categories,
Alterations of the Standards Operative Within the Categories.

One court has read in Ellerth/Faragher a suggestion that TEA's
differ from the "tangible job detriment" that had previously oper150
ated in quid pro quo analysis. This court imposed a higher
employer action hurdle than plaintiffs bore under the quid pro
quo structure. 151 Yet, in the Supreme Court's transition from quid
pro quo to TEA and from 'job detriment" to "employment action"
there is no evidence of such a shift.
Mter moving from the quid pro quo/ environmental paradigm
to the TEA/non-TEA paradigm what had previously qualified as
quid pro quo harassment continued to qualifY for absolute liability
as a TEA. Although the Court listed factors courts might consider
in ascertaining whether a given supervisor act qualified as a TEA, it
based that list on pre-existing lower court doctrine. Thus, a preEllerth court that would have recognized a particular employer act
as quid pro quo harassment should, post-Ellerth, recognize the
same act, if actually carried out, as TEA harassment.
The effect of Ellerth/Faragher was to redraw the boundary between the category of cases that warrant absolute liability, and the
category of cases that do not. The opinion in Ellerth suggests that
the types of supervisor acts that had previously qualified to establish quid pro quo harassment would now, if actuated, qualifY as
150. Reinhold v. Virginia, 151 F.3d 172 (4th Cir. 1998), superceding Reinhold v. Virginia,
135 F.3d 920 (4th Cir. 1998).
151. !d. at 174-75.
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TEA harassment. The focus was not on the nature of the acts
threatened and whether they were sufficiently adverse, but on the
fact that Ellerth's harasser had never acted on his threats. 152 In circuits that had previously limited absolute employer liability to quid
pro quo cases, Ellerth/Faragher effectively expanded the category of
absolute liability cases to include hostile environments that culminated in a TEA, but involved no libido-driven or quid pro quo
demands or threats.
In Reinhold v. Virginia, 153 however, the Fourth Circuit concluded
that the Ellerth case not only imposed a requirement that the
threatened act be carried out, but also altered the types of employer acts that, carried out, would be harsh enough to invoke the
154
rule of uniform imputation. Prior to the Supreme Court's Ellerth
decision, Reinhold won her quid pro quo harassment case before a
155
jury, and the trial and appellate courts upheld that verdict. Once
the Supreme Court issued its Ellerth decision, however, the panel
156
reheard the case in light of Ellerth, and concluded that facts
amounting to a "tangible job detriment" for purposes of quid pro
quo harassment did not amount to a "TEA" under the
157
Ellerth/Faragher standard.
A psychologist at the Virginia School for the Deaf and Blind,
Reinhold suffered her supervisor's unwanted sexual advances for
158
eighteen months. The supervisor, Dennis Martin, conducted an
ongoing campaign of harassment. 159 He entered Reinhold's office
and there recited a poem about the first time he masturbated, gave
Reinhold "pills containing sexually explicit messages," required
Reinhold to come to his office, where he repeatedly confessed his
attraction to her and professed an inability to control his feelings
for her. 160 Martin tried to kiss Reinhold, telephoned her at home
(aware that Reinhold's spouse was often away on business) and
152. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 754.
153. 151 F.3d 172 (4th Cir. 1998).
154. /d. at 174-75. The Fourth Circuit first addressed the Reinhold case in Reinhold v.
Virginia, 135 F.3d 920 (4th Cir. 1998) (Reinhold 1). The court vacated Reinhold /when it reconsidered the case in light of Faragher and Ellerth. Reinhold v. Virginia, 151 F. 3d. 172 (4th
Cir. 1998) (Reinhold II) . The vacated Reinhold I opinion remains relevant, however, because
the Fourth Circuit's second opinion incorporated by reference the Reinhold I statement of
facts. Reinhold II, 151 F.3d at 173.
155. Reinhold II, 151 F.3d at 174.
156. /d.
157. !d. at 175.
158. Reinhold I, 135 F.3d at 923. She counseled children, performed psychological testing, and worked with teachers on student behavioral problems. She also completed the
psychological portions of triennial evaluations for each student. /d. at 923.
159. /d. at 925--27.
160. /d.
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161
threatened to retaliate for Reinhold's rejection of his advances.
Ultimately, the jury concluded that he did retaliate in at least two
ways. First, when Reinhold refused Martin's invitation to attend a
professional conference alone with him/ 62 Martin selected two
other employees to accompany him and rejected Reinhold's appli163
cation to participate.
Second, as Reinhold increased her
protestations, Martin increased Reinhold's workload, including
164
work that was entirely outside her job responsibilities.
Initially, Reinhold refrained from complaining to school officials.165 She feared that Martin would harm her physically if he
learned that she had reported him and she knew that Martin had a
166
close relationship with school management. Mter she had endured the harassment for eighteen months, however, Reinhold
finally on March 9, 1992 reported Martin's behavior to Ruth Berman, the school's business manager, and to the school's human
resources director. 167 On the same day, as soon as she had made this
report, Reinhold left work and remained on leave until March 18,
168
1992. Upon investigating Reinhold's complaint, the school initially imposed penalties on Martin, but reduced the severity of
those penalties because of Martin's "previously outstanding work
performance and dedication to his job." 169
When Reinhold returned to her duties on March 18th, she was
assigned to a different building, while Martin was permitted to re170
tain his office.
Not only was Reinhold's new office space
inadequate for the work she had to do, but it was located in a
161. /d. On one occasion, when Reinhold threatened to report the harassment, Martin
said that no one would believe her. Reinhold informed him that she had retained copies of
poems he had given her. Martin responded by putting his hands around her neck and saying, "surely you threw those out." /d. at 925. When Reinhold persisted in her contention that
she had, indeed, retained them, Martin responded that what he had done earlier was not
sexual harassment, but that "this [was]," attempting to kiss her. /d. When Reinhold confided
to co-worker Kathy Verano, about Martin's behavior, the two women developed a system
whereby Verano would interrupt any private meetings between Martin and Reinhold that
exceeded five minutes in duration. ld.
162. Martin repeatedly invited Reinhold to accompany him on vacations. ld. at 926. She
responded that she was happily married and she advised him to vacation with his own wife.
/d.
163. ld.
164. ld. at 925.
165. /d. at 926.
166. ld.
167. ld. at 923, 926.
168. ld at 926. Reinhold was subsequently diagnosed as suffering from post-traumatic
stress disorder and depression caused by the harassment and the inadequacy of the school's
response. ld. at 928.
169. ld. at 927.
170. /d. The school said this measure was required because of the equipment needed
for his work. /d.
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building that was especially prone to racial tension, where Reinhold was subjected to racial slurs and hostility, including exhibition
171
of posters expressing support for Martin. When Reinhold complained to Berman and human resources about the hostility to
which she was being subjected in her new location, the school re. 172
fiuse d to tak e actiOn.
Finally, on March 27, with the approval of the school's superintendent, Martin circulated an exculpatory memorandum,
trivializing the harassment incident that had caused him to lose his
173
role as department coordinator. In Reinhold's view, the school's
approval of Martin's circulating this memorandum effectively excused Martin's actions, further lessened the impact of the
discipline, and treated Martin, rather than Reinhold, as the vic174
tim.
"Stating that the March 27 memo was the 'last straw,'
175
Reinhold gave notice of her resignation on March 30, 1992."
The jury awarded her $85,000 in damages to be paid by the
school. 176 In the first Reinhold appeal (Reinhold I), the Fourth Circuit applied the pre-Ellerth/Faragher standards. In the words of the
Reinhold I court, "Quid pro quo sexual harassment occurs when an
employer conditions, explicitly or implicitly, the receipt of a job
benefit or a tangible job detriment on the employee's acceptance
. .
or reJection
o f sexua1 a d vances. ,177
Applying this pre-Ellerth standard, the appellate court upheld the
178
verdict for Reinhold on the quid pro quo claim. The court concluded that the supervisor's assigning Reinhold extra work and
inappropriate work assignments and denying her the opportunity
to attend a professional conference constituted, in pre-Ellerth parlance, a "tangible job detriment" sufficient to support a claim of
qut'd pro quo h arassment. 179
Mter the Supreme Court issued its decisions in Faragher and
Ellerth, the panel granted petitions for rehearing to reconsider the
171. ld. at 927.
172. ld. at 927-28.
173. ld. at 928.
174. /d.
175. /d.
176. The jury returned a verdict for the employer on an additional claim for retaliation
in violation of Title VII. Reinhold Il, 151 F.3d. at 173-74.
177. Reinhold I, 135 F. 3d. at 931.
178. ld. at 936.
179. ld. at 933. The court rejected the plaintiff's verdict on the hostile environment
claim, not because the environment was not hostile, but because the employer "could not be
held liable for any hostile work environment created by [the supervisor) because as soon as
[the employer] learned of the harassment, it took adequate remedial action that resulted in
the cessation of the offensive conduct." Reinhold Il, 151 F.3d at 174 (discussing Fourth Circuit's first review of Reinhold J).
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180
181
case in light of Ellerth/Faragher. The same three judges concluded that the plaintiff had not established a TEA and remanded
182
to allow the defendant to assert the affirmative defenses. The
court did not explain why a plaintiff who had prevailed under a
standard that rendered employers strictly liable on a finding that
the plaintiff had suffered a "tangible job detriment," should fail
under a standard that rendered employers strictly liable for har183
assment involving "TEA's."
The Fourth Circuit court
acknowledged "that any significant alteration could constitute a
[TEA]," and it did not explain what it was about the changes in
Reinhold's work assignment that rendered those changes insignificant.184 Apparently Reinhold found those changes so significant
that she resigned her position because of them. The record, in
fact, suggests that Martin's deliberate retaliation against Reinhold
not only significantly altered her employment in its own right, but
that the alteration was exacerbated by the school's complicity in
holding Reinhold responsible for Martin's wrongdoing and refusing to protect her from other employees' retaliatory harassment of
her, all of which ultimately caused Reinhold to resign.
The actions taken against Reinhold were tangible for purposes
of the Supreme Court's definition. Martin acted in his official capacity through higher management in denying her request to
attend the conference. The school acted officially in transferring
her instead of him, in condoning the self-exculpatory memo and
in denying her request for assistance to halt coworkers' retaliatory
185
harassment of Reinhold.

180. Reinhold II, 151 F.3d at 173.
181. One of the panel members wrote a dissent in Reinhold/. 135 F.3d at 936 (Niemeyer,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
182. Reinhold I, 135 F.3d at 175.
183. In fact, the first Reinhold appellate decision expressly rejected the idea that quid
pro quo cases should be restricted to ultimate employment actions, quoting from an earlier
Fourth Circuit precedent:
"[t]he supervisory employee need not have ultimate authority to hire or fire to qualify as an employer, as long as he or she has significant input into such personnel
decisions." ... [W]e stated that "[t]he power to determine work assignments often
represents a key element of supervisory authority."
Reinhold /, 135 F.3d at 934 (alterations in original) (quoting Paroline v. Unisys Corp. 879
F.2d 100,104 (4th Cir. 1989), vacated in part on other grounds, 900 F.2d 27 (4th Cir. 1990)).
184. Reinhold II, 151 F.3d at 175.
185. Commentators have disagreed over whether and when an employer's failure to
remedy known co-worker harassment that is in retaliation for the employee's engaging in
protected activities should give rise to employer liability under Title VII's retaliation provision, section 704, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3. Compare Kari Jahnke, Protecting Employees from
Employees: Applying Title VII's Anti-Retaliation Provision to Co-Worker Harassment, 19 LAW & INEQ.
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The Ellerth Court required that a line be drawn between TEA
cases where power delegated by the employer to the supervisor enabled the employer to harass the plaintiff and non-TEA cases
where the effect of the harassment, though done by a supervisor,
was no different from what would have resulted from a co-worker's
harassment. Pursuant to this requirement, the Fourth Circuit drew
a line in Reinhold, but it drew it in the wrong place. Where the
Fourth Circuit draws the line is consistent with the Ellerth rationale
for cases in which the sole cause of the plaintiff's resigning her position is the unwelcome sexual advances. Advances by her coworker could have had the same result. However, where the supervisor takes retaliatory action against the victim in ways that make
use of the powers delegated by the employer, the resulting termination of employment should constitute a TEA after Ellerth just as
it would have before Ellerth and in fact did in Reinhold I itself.
Where, moreover, the employer's knowing failure 186 to protect the
victim from retaliatory harassment for her complaint and the employer's complicity in the harasser's public relations effort to paint
the victim, rather than himself, as the culprit ultimately cause the
employee to resign her position, the Supreme Court's Ellerth rationale points clearly to treating the case as one of TEA.
D. Recognizing TEAs Only in Quid Pro Quo Cases

In the words of the Ellerth/Faragher Court, a supervisor's "environmental harassment culminating in a [TEA]" imposes absolute
liability on the employer. 187 This language encompasses a broad

J.

101 (2001 ), with Olson, supra note 92. Reinhold's case also reflects problems of disaggregation and elevation of form over substance. Disaggregation entails courts' looking at each
in a series of harassing actions taken against a plaintiff in isolation, finding that no single
fact amounted to an actionable TEA where, in combination, the actions do, in fact, amount
to a TEA. Courts elevating form over substance have been hyper technical in requiring that
the company act carry an official imprimatur of the employer, rather than recognizing that
the employer's exclusion of the plaintiff from the workplace or other job detriment constitutes a TEA, whether communicated on company letterhead or not. See Watts v. Kroger Co.,
170 F.3d 505, 510 (5th Cir. 1999) (considering actions taken against plaintiff individually,
rather than in aggregation, to determine that plaintiff has not suffered adverse employment
action: "Simply changing one's work schedule is not a change in her employment status.
Neither is expanding the duties of one's job as a member of the produce department to
include mopping the floor, cleaning the chrome in the produce department, and requiring
her to check with her supervisor before taking breaks.") .
186. This failure alone should be enough to subject the employer to liability in its own
right, without any need to impute the acts of the supervisor to the employer.
187. Faragher, 524 U .S. at 808.
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range of situations. Although this would include traditional quid
pro quo cases, there is nothing in the Court's language that would
restrict the TEA characterization to such cases. Nevertheless, many
courts have limited the absolute liability category to quid pro quo
189
cases. These courts treat the TEA category as if the Ellerth Court
had simply carved off a sub-set of what had previously been quidpro quo cases. 190 Such lower courts treat the hostile environment as
a separate claim from the TEA in which it culminates: The hostile
environment claim is actionable if severe or pervasive and the TEA
claim is treated like any other disparate treatment case.
Although the Faragher opinion does not support this reading,
the Ellerth opinion arguably does. Ellerth itself involved threats, so
announced its conclusion in terms of threats:
When a plaintiff proves that a TEA resulted from a refusal to
submit to a supervisor's sexual demands, he or she establishes
that the employment decision itself constitutes a change in
the terms and conditions of employment that is actionable
under Title VII. For any sexual harassment preceding the
employment decision to be actionable, however, the conduct
must be severe or pervasive. Because Ellerth 's claim involves
only unfulfilled threats, it should be categorized as a hostile
work environment claim which requires a showing of severe
. cond uct. 191
or pervasive
The language of Ellerth, while including actuated quid pro quo
cases in the absolute employer liability category does not necessar192
ily restrict the definition of TEA's to quid pro quo claims.
Moreover, the Faragher case, which did not involve quid pro quo
threats, included no reference to such threats in its articulation of
188. SeeLissae v. S. Food Svc., 159 F.3d 177, 184 (4th Cir. 1998) (Michaels,], dissenting)
(TEA occurs whenever the action raken against the plaintiff is in any way related to the harassment). Thus, the boss who retaliates against a worker because the worker refuses the boss'
sexual advance exposes the employer to the same liability as the boss who retaliates because
the worker reports the boss' open and active hostility toward women in the workplace. In
either event, the nexus between the harassment and the adverse action is established by
proof of the harassment and the single actor.
189. See, e.g., Fatjam v. N.Y. Health & Hosp. Corp., 96 Civ. 1231 (KMW) (RLE), 2000
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3741 , *48 (S.D.N.Y Mar. 23, 2000).
190. If the case does not involve sexual advances whose rejection motivates the supervisor to take the TEA, the case is deemed environmental.
191. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 753-54. (citations omitted)
192. The middle sentence in the above quotation (regarding actionability of the environmental portion alone) may be read as clarification of the standard of proof for the
environmental portion if pursued independently, rather than intended to exclude the environmental portion of the claim from the absolute liability category.
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the holding. As set forth in Faragher, the standard for absolute employer liability focuses simply on the harassment's culmination m
TEA, without regard to the presence of sexual demandsAn employer is subject to vicarious liability to a victimized
employee for an actionable hostile environment created by a
supervisor with imm~diate (or successively higher) authority
over the employee. When no TEA is taken, a defending employer may raise an affirmative defense to liability or damages,
193
subject to proof by a preponderance of the evidence.
Arguably, then, Ellerth means to exclude non-actuated threats, but
to include non-quid pro quo TEA harassment that did not involve
threats to begin with.
Courts lim~ting TEA to cases involving rejection of sexual demands, view the situation as giving rise to two claims: One for the
hostile environment, if it was sufficiently severe or pervasive to be
actionable; and one for the TEA, which is treated as a traditional
disparate treatment claim. One problem with breaking up the case
in this manner is that the harassment preceding the TEA becomes
mere evidence in the disparate treatment case, rather than a part
of the TEA claim, even where the earlier harassment is inextricably
194
a part of the process that resulted in the TEA. As an independent
cause of action, the environmental claim is defeated by the affirmative defense, on which, given current trends, it may be safe to
assume the defendant will prevail. An analytic structure that recognizes TEA harassment only if sexual advances are involved
excludes large numbers of serious harassment cases entirely from
any Title VII protection.
195
The case of Angel Watkins is illustrative. According to Watkins'
196
evidence, her immediate supervisor, Kel~y, harassed her. The
193. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 689.
194. Treating such harassment claims in accordance with proof structures employed for
straight disparate treatment claims poses its own problems. A successful environmental harassment case, preceding a TEA, creates a very persuasive case that the animus that caused
the environmental harassment also caused the TEA regardless of whether the harassment
was severe or persuasive. This is undoubtedly so where the same supervisor takes both actions, but even arguably so where more than one supervisor colludes against the plaintiff.
Yet, courts' tendency to view all cases through the McDonnell Douglas prism, regardless of
how direct the evidence, may cause such cases to get hung up on the shoals of requiring the
plaintiff to prove the negative-that the defendant's legitimate nondiscriminatory reason was
not the real or only reason, even where she has persuaded the trier of fact tha t the environmental harassment occurred.
195. Watkins v. Prof! Sec. Bureau, No. 98-2555, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 29841 (4th Cir.
Nov. 15, 1999) cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1108 (2000); see also Zelaya v. Eastern & Western Hotel
Corp., No. 99-16179, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 3492, *2-3 (9th Cir. Mar. 5, 2001) (finding no
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197

harassment included rape and fondling. Watkins testified that
she was required to attend a meeting with three supervisors, in198
cluding Kelly. At that meeting, she informed the three that she
199
had reported the harassment to the EEOC. In response, and in
the presence of the other two supervisors, Kelly immediately ter200
.
dWtki'
mmate
a ns employment.
Watkins sued under Title VII, alleging that her termination resulted from her complaints of the sexual harassment. 201 A jury
reached a verdict for Watkins on her claims of harassment and retaliation.202 The trial court set the verdict aside, granting judgment
as a matter of law for the employer, and the appellate court affirmed, finding no connection between the harassment and the
.
.
203
termmati.on.
There are two problems with the appellate court's Watkins holding: One in the court's reading of the facts and the other in its
reading of the Supreme Court's Ellerth/Faragher holding. With respect to the facts of Watkins' case, the problem is that plaintiff's
evidence (which the jury believed) showed that it was Kelly, the
harasser, who made the decision to terminate Watkins. 204 The trial
and appellate courts' decision to reject this evidence constituted a
clear-cut credibility determination. Courts may, of course, overrule
jury findings of fact, but only when no reasonable jury could find
the fact as found; the jury's credibility determinations are to be
given great deference.205
More importantly for present purposes, the appellate court's
reading of the Ellerth/Faragher opinions ignores the Supreme
Court's definition of TEA, which included situations in which a
"hostile environment culminates in a [TEA]." Logically, more than

T£A where supervisor threatened subordinate that, if she told her husband about advances,
she would be fired and when she again threatened to tell husband, supervisor took her keys
and told her to "go home" which apparently ended her term of employment).
196. Watkins, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 29841, at *4.
197. /d.
198. /d. at *5.
199. /d. at *6.
200. /d.
201. /d. at *7.
202. !d. at *8.
203. /d. at *1-2.
204. According to Watkins' testimony, which the jury apparently believed, the harasser
himself, Kelly, told Watkins that she was being terminated at the point in that meeting when
Watkins stated that she had reported Kelly's acts to the EEOC. /d. at *6. The appellate court
noted that "Nicola's account of the termination is diametrically opposed to Watkins' account," but arguably this inconsistency became irrelevant when the jury chose to believe
Watkins. /d. at *6 n.6.
205. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000).

SuMMER

2002]

After Ellerth

851

one supervisor can be responsible for creation of a hostile envi206
ronment that culminates in a TEA. Watkins met with all three of
207
her supervisors, Fisher, Nicola, and Kelly. In the course the meeting, the higher-ups allowed Kelly, the harasser, to terminate
208
Watkins when she informed them of her complaint to the EEOC.
The harassment of plaintiff did culminate in the TEA, although
her rejection of the harasser's sexual advances did not immediately
precipitate the TEA.
Jennifer Elmasry's case received similar treatment. 209 Elmasry's
immediate supervisor, Bill Veith, hired Elmasry in November of
210
1997 and fired her four months later. In the interim, he sexually
harassed Elmasry, touching and commenting upon her intimate
body parts, hugging her, and offering her favors, including money
and free meals. 211 Elmasry "did not want to accept these favors but
felt that she had to because Veith was her boss. She . .. believed
that Veith wanted some sort of sexual relationship with her in re212
turn for the favorable treatment he gave her." She repeatedly told
Veith that his attentions were unwelcome. 213 There would have
been little point in reporting the harassment to higher management, because Veith's supervisor, Nar Handa, shared Veith's
214
attitude. When Handa was about to visit the plant, Veith told
206. Watkins, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 29841, at *13 ("Watkins herself acknowledges
[there was no TEA] by arguing that she was terminated in retaliation for threatening to
report Kelley's conduct to the police and the EEOC."). In fact, Watkins' evidence suggested
that three supervisors were responsible for the creation of a hostile environment that included the sexual assault incidents by one of the three. The evidence showed that one of the
non-assaulting supervisors suggested to Watkins that she should be thanking the assaulting
supervisor for her position because Watkins otherwise would have been terminated. /d. at
*4. But see Louis DiLorenzo & Laura Harshbarger, Emplnyer Liability for Superois,. Harassment
afterEIIerth and Faragher, 6 DuKE]. GENDER L. & PoL'Y 3, n . 107 (arguing that TEA must be
imposed by the harasser).
207. Watkins, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 29841 at *5-6.
208. /d. at *6.
209. Elmasry v. Veith, No. 98-696-JD, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 340 (D.N.H.Jan. 7, 2000).
210. /d. at *3.
211. /d. at *3-5.
212. !d. at *5. Under company policy, Veith was the proper authority to receive Elmasry's reports of harassment. She repeatedly complained to Veith himself about his
behavior, but to no avail. /d. at *22-23.
213. /d. at *22.
214. At Elmasry's deposition, the following colloquy took place:

Q.

And it was your conclusion that once you told Bill [Veith] you didn't
like the way he was talking, and he continued to talk that way, that there
was nothing else you could do? Is that what you-

A.

There was no one else to tum to. Because I had already met [higher
ma nagement] and .. . they were like him.

/d. at *20.
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Elmasry to "wear her hair down, a nice dress and high heeled
shoes," and warned her that Handa "might try to take her away
from Veith ... when he saw her breasts. "215
Shortly before Veith fired Elmasry, he invited her out for her
birthday and told her that he had "something special" for her. 216
Mraid of Veith, Elmasry complained to the police, who told her to
stay home from work. 217 After Elmasry had stayed home for two
218
·
days, Veith fired her for missing work.
Even though Elmasry's harasser fired her, the court granted
summary judgment for the employer on the TEA issue, stating that
"[i]fVeith [had] fired Elmasry because she refused to submit to his
sexual demands, the firing would [have]constitute[d] a TEA."219
Because the court found no TEA, it allowed the defendant to assert
the affirmative defense. 220 Yet, the harassment clearly culminated in a
TEA. Admittedly, Elmasry's unexcused absence intervened as a
cause, but the reason for her unexcused absence was the need to
avoid the harasser and the unavailability of any other recourse. By
constraining the TEA definition to include only quid pro quo harassment, the court excluded on a summary judgment motion what,
if proved true, would have been a flagrant case of TEA harassment.
21

E. Conjlation of Retaliation Doctrine and Harassment Doctrinl

Because harassment often involves retaliation, a single set of
facts may create claims for both TEA harassment and section 704

215. /d.
216. /d. at *6.
217. /d. at* 7.
218. !d. at *7.
219. /d. at*17.
220. /d. at *26. In addition, because it found no TEA, the court required the plaintiff to
show that the harassment was severe or pervasive.
221. Section 704(a) of Title VII forbids employer retaliation for employee assertion of
Title VII rights. Such assertions may consist of participation in administrative or judicial
proceedings to enforce Title VII rights or less formal opposition to practices that (the employee reasonably believes) violate Title VII. The latter include employee protests directly to
the discriminating supervisor.
As long as Title VII forbids or appears to forbid the discrimination in question, Title VII
prohibits retaliation, even though the employee actually invokes a legal ground other tha t
Title VII itself. Thus if the employee invokes a state law protection that duplicates Title VII,
Title VII prohibits retaliation. In addition, as explained below, the employee's reasonable
belief that a violation has o ccurred is sufficient to create a right against retaliation even
though ultimately there may prove to have been no violation.
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222

retaliation. Consider, for example, a supervisor who asks a subordinate to engage in sexual acts and fires the subordinate when she
objects to those requests. 223 This is clearly a case of TEA harassment; it also qualifies as retaliation under section 704.224 Although
many Title VII cases qualifY as both harassment and retaliation,
litigants and courts have not systematically acknowledged that overlap or crafted any coherent process for choosing which doctrine (if
not both) should apply to the facts of a given case.
TEA analysis can be very different from retaliation analysis, so
the court's decision about which type of analysis applies to a par225
ticular case may determine the outcome. The statutory basis for
222. Because there are TEA's that do not constitute direct retaliation for rejection of a
sexual advance or complaint about sexual harassment, there are TEA's that do not qualify
for analysis under section 704.
223. See Johnson v. Booker T. Washington Broad. Serv., No. 99-6078, 2000 U.S. App.
LEXIS 30772, *10 (11th Cir. Nov. 29, 2000) ("statutorily protected expression includes ...
complaining to supervisors about sexual harassment") (citing Rollins v. State of Fla. Dep 't of
Law Enforcement, 868 F.2d 397, 400 (11th Cir. 1989)). If the supervisor accompanies the
request with a threat that the subordinate will be fired if she refuses, the case involves traditional quid pro quo harassment. As discussed above, non-quid pro quo TEA's are equally
exempt from the Ellerth affirmative defenses.
224. Examples of other situations in which both TEA harassment doctrine and section
704 retaliation doctrine could apply are:
1.
A supervisor engages in severe or pervasive harassment of a subordinate
employee because of the subordinate's sex. The subordinate complains,
whether to the harassing supervisor or to higher management. The supervisor fires the subordinate because of the complaint.
2.

As in the previous facts, a supervisor engages in severe or pervasive harassment of a subordinate employee because of the subordinate's sex,
and the subordinate complains.

3.

The supervisor does not fire the subordinate when the latter complains,
but-because of the complaint-refuses to protect the subordinate
when other employees harass the subordinate, whether the latter harassment is in response to the complaint or in response to the victim's
sex. This last set of facts poses the additional problem of whether and
when employer's retaliatory actions do not consist of formal official
personnel actions, retaliation may nevertheless be found.

4.

A supervisor refuses to give a subordinate a promotion because the
subordinate is a woman. The subordinate complains to higher management or human resources. As a result of the complaint, the
supervisor creates a hostile work environment for the subordinate. See
Richardson v. Dept. of Corr., 180 F.3d 426, 443 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting
"no disagreement that Richardson engaged in protected activity when
she complained to supervisors about harassment").

225. The ramifications of such cross-pollination can be dispositive in the environmental
context as well. Consider the case of a subordinate who reports the hostile environment to
which a group of supe rvisors subjects her and who is harassed more as a result. Some circuits
recognize section 704 retaliation claims for such retaliatory harassment (i.e., do not impose
the heightened harm requirements discussed earlier in this article). See Wideman v. WalMart Stores, Inc., 141 F.3d 1453, 1456 (11th Cir. 1998)) (citing Wyatt v. City of Boston, 15-16
(1st Cir. 1994); Berry v. Stevinson Chevrolet, 74 F.3d 980, 984-86 (lOth Cir. 1996) ; Yartzoffv.
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sexual harassment claims is section 703, which prohibits discrimination in the terms, conditions or privileges of employment. The
statutory basis for retaliation claims, section 704, prohibits em226
ployer retaliation for employees '
opposition to any practice
227
(including sexual harassment) prohibited by Title VII. The primary reason why the choice between section 703 and section 704
can be dispositive is that "mixed motive" analysis, which all circuits
apply in appropriate section 703 cases, is unavailable in the section
228
704 cases of some circuits. Mixed motive analysis allows plaintiffs
to prevail (though with reduced remedies) by showing that, even
though the defendant shows that other, non-discriminatory, rea229
sons were also at work. By the terms of Title VII, mixed-motive
230
analysis is available in section 703 cases. Because the statute is
silent on the availability of mixed motive analysis in retaliation
cases, 231 some circuits have refused to apply mixed motive doctrine
Thomas, 809 F.2d 1371, 1375 (9th Cir. 1987)); Olson, supra note 92, at 258. If these circuits
allow the section 704 claim, but import the Ellerth affirmative defense, the harassment will go
unremedied. Because courts tend to presume that employers have made reasonable efforts
to respond to harassment, the protections of section 704 will thereby have been weakened.
226. In 1998, the Supreme Court held that the term, "employees," for purposes of section 704, includes former employees. Robinson v. Shell Oil, 519 U.S. 337 (1997).
227. In addition to protecting employees' informal opposition to discrimination, section 704 protects their participation in processes available for challenging discrimination. In
April of 2001, the Supreme Court considered a case in which the Ninth Circuit had applied
the "reasonable belief" standard. Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeder, 532 U.S. 268 (2001 ). In
that case, the plaintiff had protested her supervisor's snickering in the plaintiff's presence
\\ith a male co-worker about sexual references in a job application. /d. at 269. The Supreme
Court found it unnecessary to resolve the split in the circuits on whether the plaintiff's reasonable belief that the conduct violates Title VII. Id. at 270. Even assuming that was the
standard, the Court stated, "[n] o reasonable person could have believed that the single
incident recounted ... violated Title VII's standard." Id. at 271. Given the professed confusion among the general public about what is and is not sexual harassment, this victim's
conclusion that her supervisor's conduct violated the law is not so far fetched that the court
should remove the decision from the jury as here happened in the grant of summary judgment for the employer. Surely this is quintessentially a jury issue. See Deborah Zalesne, Sexual
Harassment Law: Has it Gone too Far, or Has the Media? 8 TEMP. POL. & C1v. RTs. L.R. 351, 353
(1999) (describing public confusion about what constitutes harassment).
228. SeeTanca v. Nordberg, 98 F.3d 680, 684 (1st Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1119
(1997) (rejecting mixed motive analysis for retaliation cases).
229. Civil Rights Act ofl991, Pub. L. Nos. 102-166, Title I,§§ 105, 106, 107(a), 108, 105
Stat. 1074-1076 (1991), codified as amended 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (adding Title VII
§ 703(m)).
230. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).
231. The availability of mixed motive analysis benefits plaintiffs by allowing victory even
where discrimination is not the only reason. But it also helps defendants, by reducing remedies when they show they would have reached the same decision against the plaintiff even in
the absence of the discriminatory reason:
(B)
On a claim in which an individual proves a violation under section
703(m) [42 uses§ 2000e-2(m)] and a respondent demonstrates that
the respondent would have taken the same action in the absence of the
impermissible motivating factor, the court-
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232

in those cases. In the latter group of circuits, even though the
plaintiff proves that the defendant has retaliated, the defendant
may prevail by demonstrating that nondiscriminatory factors were
233
also at work in the decision against the plaintiff.
(i)

(ii)

may grant declaratory relief, injunctive relief (except as provided
in clause (ii)). and attorney's fees and costs demonstrated to be
directly attributable only to the pursuit of a claim under section
703(m) § 42USCS § 2000e-2(m)]; and
shall not award damages or issue an order requiring any admission, reinstatement, hiring, promotion, or payment, described in
subparagraph (A)

/d.

232. A majority of the circuits have declined to recognize mixed motive analysis in section 704 retaliation claims. The Seventh Circuit in McNutt v. Board of Trustees, for example,
observed that Congress had explicitly addressed retaliation claims in other sections of the
1991 Civil Rights Act, but not in the provision that authorized mixed-motive analysis. 141
F.3d 706, 707-09 (7th Cir. 1998). Other circuits have agreed. See Kubicko v. Ogden Logistics
Serv., 181 F.3d 544, 552 n.7 (4th Cir. 1999); Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., 109 F.3d 913, 93335 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 914 (1997); Tanca v. Nordberg, 98 F.3d 680, 684-85
(1st Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1119 (1997); see also Lewis v. Young Men's Christian
Ass'n, 208 F.3d 1303, 1305 (11th Cir. 2000) (Civil Rights Act does not apply to dual motive
retaliation claim under ADEA); cf Norbeck v. Basin Elec. Power Coop., 215 F.3d 848, 852
(8th Cir. 2000) (mixed-motive analysis unavailable in retaliation cases under the False
Claims Act). But see DeLiano v. N.D. State Univ., 951 F. Supp. 168. 170 (D.N.D. 1997) (holding that Civil Rights Act provisions apply to mixed motive retaliation cases); Hall v. City of
Brawley, 887 F. Supp. 1333, 1346 (S.D. Cal. 1995) (same). This is inconsistent with the position taken by some Title VII experts, who argue that section 704 should be given a more proplaintiff construction than section 703:
Indeed, as some courts have noted, the statutory language of section 704, which contains no reference to "compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment," may suggest a broader sweep for section 704 than for section 703.
McDonnell v. Cisneros, 84 F.3d 256, 262 (7th Cir. 1996); see also Essary & Friedman, supra
note 87 at 140-41 ("The anti-retaliation provision, which is not limited to a specific definition, as is the substantive discrimination provision, may be construed more broadly. ... ");
EEOC Guidance on Retaliation Claims, [Analyzing Retaliation Claims, 1998 Daily Lab Rep.,
(BNA) 100 d27 (May 20, 1998)] ("The retaliation provisions set no qualifiers on the term
[']to discriminate,' and therefore prohibit any discrimination that is reasonably likely to
deter protected activity. They do not restrict the actions that can be challenged to those that
affect the terms and conditions of employment."); White, supra note 84, at 1164 n.234.
233. SeeTanca v. Nordberg, 98 F.3d 680,684 (1st Cir. 1996) , cert. denied, 520 U.S. lll9
( 1997) (rejecting mixed motive analysis for retaliation cases). The 1991 Civil Rights Act
amendments to Title VII provide:
(m) Impermissible consideration of race, color, religion , sex, or national origin in
employment practices. Except as otherwise provided in this title [ 42 USCS §§ 2000e
et seq.]. an unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party
demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, br national origin was a motivating factor
for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.
Pub. L. Nos. 102-166, Title I,§§ 107, 112, 113(b), 105 Stat. 1075, 1078, 1079. Although, ostensibly, the McDonnell Douglas framework fits the section 704 retaliation context, courts
have used the McDonnell Douglas analysis in direct evidence cases in ways that eliminate the
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The case that Elizabeth Smith filed against First Union Bank
demonstrates other problems that occur where section 704 jurisprudence intersects with TEA doctrine. 2 !14 Smith essentially lost
both her harassment claim and her retaliation claim. The harassment claim failed in the sense that the court treated it as non-TEA,
thus allowed the affirmative defense to go forward.235 She lost on
the retaliation claim because the appellate court disaggregated the
facts comprising the retaliation with the result that there appeared
to be no connection between the harassment and the adverse employment action underlying her retaliation claim.
Smith's supervisor, Scoggins, "subjected Smith to a barrage of
236
threats and gender-based insults." In addition to general and often obscene derogation of women's professional abilities, Scoggins
237
threatened Smith with physical violence. Smith did not initially
complain because Scoggins told her that "she would lose her job if
she complained about his conduct," and Scoggins' superior also
warned Smith that "she should never complain to human re238
sources. " Smith endured the harassment for more than a year,
until she became fearful that Scoggins would carry out his threats
of physical violence, at which time she registered a complaint with
Marc Hutto, the Bank's human resources representative. 239 She

possibility that plaintiffs can win mixed-motive cases. See Cleary v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.,
No. 00-1461, 2001 U.S. App. 11318, *11-14 (4th Cir. May 31, 2001) (requiring plaintiff to
show that defendant's proffered legitimate nondiscriminatory reason pretextual even if
plaintiff has proved causal connection between plaintiff' protected act and adverse action
taken by plaintiff). But see Marquez v. Baker Process, Inc., No. 014019, 2002 U .S. App.
LEXJS 13288, *6--13 (lOth Cir.July 2, 2002) (applying McDonnell Douglas to direct evidence
retaliation case and reversing summary judgment for employer). This, operating in tandem
with other courts' express denial of mixed motive analysis in retaliation cases, has sharply
curtailed the protections afforded by section 704.
234. Smith v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 202 F.3d 234 (4th Cir. 2000).
235. Id. at 246--47. Smith obtained a technical victory on appeal in that the appellate
court found that there was a genuine issue of fact on whether the bank had provt:d both
elements of the affirmative defense. Id. She lost, however, in that the case received treatment
as a non-TEA case to begin with.
236. Id. at 238. Among his harassing comments were that Scoggins wished he were a
woman so that he could "whore his way through life" and that the "only way for a woman to
get ahead at First Union is to spread her legs." Id. at 243 n.6.
237. Scoggins stood over Smith's cubicle and barked orders at her and often concluded
his orders to her with the remark, "or else you'll see what will happe n to you." /d. at 239. He
also threatened her when he called her at home at I 0:00 p .m., accusing her of conspiring
with his supervisor, George Andrews, to "get him." !d. at 239. "Scoggins made what a jury
co uld find was a thinly veiled threat to kill Smith because of her gender in a way that made
Smith feel that he was serious about ha rming her, especially in light of Scoggins' boasting
about 'taking people out' while he was in the military." !d. at 243.
238. /d. at 245.
239. Id. at 240.
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asked to be reassigned immediately to a workstation out of the vicinity of Scoggin's workstation.~
First Union did not investigate Smith's sexual harassment allegations, but suspended both Scoggins and Smith with pay and
referred both to the company's Employee Assistance Program
(EAP). When Smith informed the EAP counselor, Michael Price, of
Scoggins' harassment, Price advised her not to return to a work site
near Scoggins.241 First Union then agreed to transfer Smith to a different team, but the new team was only 100 feet from Scoggins'
242
team. Smith consulted a therapist, who told her that she suffered
from "an adjustment disorder caused, at least in part, by Scoggins'
harassing conduct. "243 The therapist advised her not to work in
Scoggins' vicinity.244 When Smith informed Hutto of this advice,
Hutto became annoyed and warned her that she would be terminated if she did not submit her disability papers within fifteen
245
days. Hutto subsequently advised Smith that she would be permitted to come back to work to a position away from Scoggins only
if she first returned to her former position in Scoggins' area. 246
247
Smith declined to follow Hutto's instructions. Ostensibly, the
bank relented, allowing Smith to apply for other jobs at First Un248
ion without first returning to work in Scoggins' area. Although
she applied for seventy-five openings, however, she received no offers.249 She remained on disability leave until July 1995, when the
250
bank fired her.
The federal district court granted the bank's motion for sum251
mary judgment on all counts. The Fourth Circuit reversed the
trial court on the question of whether Scoggins' behavior created
an actionable hostile environment.252 Clearly, the Fourth Circuit
said, it did.253 On the question of whether the Bank should be held
40

240. /d. at 239.
241. /d. at 240.
242. /d.
243. /d.
244. /d.
245. /d.
246. /d.
247. /d.
248. /d.
249. /d. at 234.
250. /d.
251. !d. at 241.
252. Id at 246-47.
253. /d. at 241-44. Scoggin's treatment of Smith was: (1) because of her sex; (2) unwel·
come; and (3) severe or pervasive. /d. The trial court had concluded, as to (l) that Scoggins
was abusive toward me mbers of both sexes, thus not motivated by Smith's sex. The appellate
court concluded that the harasser's disparaging references to plaintiff's se x made it cle ar
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vicariously liable for the harassment, however, the Fourth Circuit
254
affirmed summary judgment for the employer. The Fourth Circuit allowed the defendant to invoke the Ellerth/Faragher defense
because "Smith ha[d] not allege[d] that she suffered a tangible
255
employment action due to Scoggin's harassment." Excluding the
TEA issue meant that the plaintiff's only hope for recovery lay in
the retaliation claim.
On the retaliation claim, however, the appellate court also affirmed summary judgment for the defendant. 256 Smith's retaliation
claim was that First Union retaliated against her because she com257
plained about Scoggins' harassment of her. The Fourth Circuit
disaggregated the facts underlying the retaliation claim: ( 1) it recognized that Hutto harbored an animus toward Smith that might
have contributed to her ultimate termination; (2) it recognized
that Hutto's animus toward Smith resulted directly from her disability claim; (3) it recognized that the disability claim resulted
directly from the harassment and First Union's refusal to reassign
258
Smith away from the harasser. Yet, the court refused to draw the
necessary conclusion that the harassment thus culminated in
Smith's termination. If the court had indeed followed its own edict:
to view the facts at the summary judgment stage in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party, it would have left to the jury to
decide the question of whether the harassment culminated in the
termination, rather than granting summary judgment for the defendant.
The fact that Smith did indeed offer sufficient proof to avoid
summary judgment on the retaliation question necessarily means
that she should have prevailed on the TEA issue and thus avoided
any need even to consider the affirmative defense. The employer
in this case took action against Smith (firing her) in retaliation for
her submitting a disability claim, which claim she submitted be-

that Scoggins was motivated by Smith's sex. On the requirement of severity or pervasiveness,
the uial court had fo und for the employer because "[P]Iaintiff has not claimed that
Scoggins ever inappropriately touched, propositioned or ogled her, that Scoggins ever invited her, explicitly or by implication, to have sex with him or to go out on a date with him."
Id. at 242. The Fourth Circuit disagreed, explaining that the district court "failed to recognize that a woman's work environment can be hostile even if she is not subjected to sexual
advances or propositions." Id. (citations omitted).
254. Id. at 244.
255. Jd. at 244. According to the appellate court, the parties had fully briefed the
Ellerlh/Faragher issues, so the failure the plaintiff's failure to raise the tangible employment
action possibility may have constituted a waiver of the issue.
256. Jd. at 249.
257. Jd. at 241.
258. ld. at 249.
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cause the employer refused to offer a non-hostile environment in
which to work.
The intersection between retaliation doctrine and TEA harassment doctrine thus resembles a minefield for plaintiffs with even
the most meritorious claims. It is uncertain whether the Smith
court would have required a closer causal nexus for retaliation
than for harassment culminating in a TEA. What is clear is that the
court's decision not to consider the TEA possibility left the plaintiff
with only a retaliation claim, which the court disaggregated into
separate factual units to avoid finding a causal nexus. Once the
facts were disconnected, the court then declined to apply mixed
motive analysis, so that the permissible motive (the disability claim)
sufficed to exonerate the defendant completely.

CoNCLUSION

In sexual harassment litigation, the decision whether to characterize a supervisor's harassment as TEA often decides the outcome
of the case. If the supervisor's action is deemed a TEA, the plaintiff
has a possibility of prevailing in imposing liability on the employer.
If the supervisor's action is not deemed a TEA, the employer's ability to invoke the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense is likely to
result in the employer's immunity from liability for Title VII violations. Despite the importance of how the supervisor's act is
characterized, courts have employed several analytical methods
that have weighted the process very heavily against the TEA characterization. These methodologies evince intrinsic flaws that warrant
careful rethinking by the courts, for their current use effectively
thwarts the promise of Title VII.

